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ABSTRACT
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine estimated that approximately 98,000 deaths resulted annually from medical errors.
This shocking number does not appear to have lessened during
the intervening years. Mistake-proofing techniques similar to
those that have proven useful in the product liability context
hold great promise for reducing the number of medical errors.
However, the adoption of such techniques in healthcare settings
is more limited than expected.
This article examines potentially useful mistake-proofing
techniques, explores the largely unsound reasons why healthcare
professionals have been slow to adopt such techniques, and explores the implications of mistake-proofing adoption (or lack
thereof) for malpractice litigation and liability. Along the way,
this article considers the undesirable effects of misperceptions
on the part of healthcare professionals regarding their risks of
being held liable in a malpractice case. This article also proposes ways of encouraging greater adoption of mistake-proofing
techniques and other error-reduction practices in healthcare
contexts.
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INTRODUCTION

Issues of healthcare access and affordability have received
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considerable media attention in recent years and have been the
subjects of political debate, regulatory action, and judicial decisions.1 Although the focus on access and affordability has not
kept healthcare quality issues from also being noted, the problem of how to improve healthcare quality remains a troublesome one.2 An “unconscionable error rate”3 documented in a
landmark study in 1999 by the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
shocked many, as the IOM estimated that up to 98,000 deaths

1. Most notably, huge numbers of media reports dealt with controversies
preceding and following the 2010 enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights
Is Rallying Cry of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A1 (providing
examples of states’ legislative reactions asserting states’ rights); Kevin Sack,
In Partisan Battle, Governors Clash With Attorneys General Over Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A25 (highlighting states with partisan battles
relating to the decision to join the federal health care mandate litigation); see
also James Osborne, Tenth Amendment Movement Aims to Give Power Back to
the States, FOX NEWS (May 26, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2009/05/26/tenth-amendment-movement-aims-power-states (noting that at
least 35 states asserted Tenth Amendment rights within the year). In the
high-profile 2012 decision on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute’s individual mandate—the requirement that all individuals have health insurance in force in 2014 and
thereafter or else incur an obligation to make a shared responsibility payment,
26 U.S.C. §5000A (2012)—was a valid exercise of the congressional power to
tax. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-393, 11-398 and 11-400, slip
op. at 33–44 (U.S. June 28, 2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing Congress with the “power to lay and collect taxes”). The Court, however,
held that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in providing that a state
risked losing all existing Medicaid funding if it declined to participate in a
Medicaid expansion that Congress initially would fully fund but that later
would lead to an obligation on the part of the state to pay ten percent of the
added costs. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., slip op. at 49–50. The Court resolved
the constitutional problem by holding that states could decide whether to participate in the Medicaid expansion without risking the loss of existing Medicaid funding if they said “no” to the expansion. Id. at 55–58.
2. See, e.g., John W. Hill, Arlen W. Langvardt & Anne P. Massey, Law,
Information Technology, and Medical Errors: Toward a National Healthcare
Information Network Approach to Improving Patient Care and Reducing Malpractice Costs, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 159, 159–65 (noting the growing role that information technology should play in reducing medical errors);
Phillip T. Powell & Ron Laufer, Promises and Constraints of ConsumerDirected Healthcare, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 171, 171–72, 177 (2010) (arguing that
consumer-directed healthcare will not only lower costs, but also increase quality).
3. David Ahern, Patient-Centered Computing and eHealth: Transforming Healthcare Quality, Introductory Remarks at Harvard Medical School
Seminar (Mar. 28–30, 2008) (on file with authors).
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per year resulted from medical errors.4 There are indications
that the incidence of errors has not abated in the years since
the IOM’s study, and may even be increasing.5 Accounts of serious medical errors continue to abound.6
A 2006 report by the IOM identified quality problems so
serious that, on average, a hospital patient would be subjected
to at least one medication error per day.7 In a “national report
card” on American healthcare, the Rand Corporation concluded

4. Inst. of Med., To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 31
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN].
5. See David L. Classen et al., “Global Trigger Tool” Shows That Adverse
Events in Hospitals May Be Ten Times Greater Than Previously Measured, 30
HEALTH AFF. 581, 581–82, 586 (2011) (implementing a new method for detecting adverse events in a hospital setting); Christopher P. Landrigan et al.,
Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2130, 2133 (2010) (reporting the results of a study of
ten North Carolina hospitals); U.S. Hospital Errors Continue to Rise, WASH.
POST (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/04/02/AR2007040200813.html (reporting the results from an examination of Medicare hospitalization records); see also A National Survey of Medical Error Reporting Laws, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 201, 202
(2008) [hereinafter National Survey] (extrapolating the error rate from the
IOM study to the population numbers in 2006).
6. See, e.g., Charles R. Denham et al., An NTSB for Health Care—
Learning From Innovation: Debate and Innovate or Capitulate, 8 J. PATIENT
SAFETY 3, 5 (2012) (sharing story of heparin overdose to twin infants); Liz
Kowalczyk, Mass. Patient Death Rate a Concern, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2007, at
B1 (stating that the Massachusetts patient death rate is higher than the national average); Liz Kowalczyk, Surgical Mistakes Persist in Bay State, BOS.
GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2007, at A1 (highlighting various surgical errors at a Massachusetts hospital); Jordan Rau, Hospital Mistakes Go Public, L.A. TIMES, June
30, 2008, at A1 (providing examples of hospital errors in California); Family
Sues Geisinger Over Newborn’s Death, PENNLIVE.COM (Jan. 11, 2008),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2008/01/family_sues_geisinger_ov
er_new.html (reporting that an overdose of antibiotics by the hospital led to
the death of one infant and permanent brain injury in another); Family Sues
Hospital After Man’s Tonsil Surgery Death, FOX NEWS (Aug. 28, 2008),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,412222,00.html (alleging that an incorrectly adjusted breathing tube caused suffocation); Tape Shows Woman Dying
on Waiting Room Floor, CNN (July 1, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/
US/07/01/waiting.room.death/index.html.
7. Michael Brophy, The July 2006 IOM Report on Medication Errors,
MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY (ALM Media Properties, L.L.C., New York,
N.Y.), Sept. 2006, available at http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/
ljn_medlaw/23_12/news/147223-1.html. The 2006 IOM report estimated that
at least 1.5 million preventable medication errors occur each year in hospitals
and similar medical facilities. INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION
ERRORS 124 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter IOM, PREVENTING
MEDICATION ERRORS].
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that over time, almost everyone in the United States is at risk
of receiving poor healthcare.8 An estimated four percent of all
patients entering hospitals experience some type of adverse incident, approximately half of which are preventable and twenty-five percent of which stem from negligence.9
Healthcare systems have become more complex as they
have evolved.10 Various healthcare providers (HCPs)—for instance, hospitals, clinics, physicians, nurses, other medical professionals, and staff persons—all play roles in the furnishing of
care to patients. For institutional HCPs, there are dual lines of
authority for clinical and administrative staff and powerful
subcultures that may often clash.11 As a result, it may not be
clear where the ultimate responsibility for reducing healthcare
errors resides in a given HCP.12 Healthcare processes also tend
to be insufficiently connected to one another in any real-time
fashion,13 leading to gaps in information flow and resulting in
uneven delivery of care.14 If the error rates in intensive care
8. RAND HEALTH, THE FIRST NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON QUALITY OF
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 3 (2006), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9053-2.pdf (finding that there is little
variation in receiving recommended medical care, even when looking at race,
gender, or financial status of individuals); see also Denham et al., supra note
6, at 3–4 (stating that healthcare harm is the third leading cause of death in
the United States). Perhaps one of the most glaring indications of underlying
systemic problems is that the United States, despite its higher healthcare expenditures, has a higher infant mortality rate than any other industrialized
nation belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS:
HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT 93 (2005).
9. Jonathon Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing
Medical Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 679 (2006).
10. Brad Broberg, Medical Errors Going Under the Microscope, PUGET
SOUND BUS. J., (Oct. 28, 2007, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/
stories/2007/10/29/focus1.html (focusing on the impact that variability has on
whether the complex system works smoothly).
11. R. Nat Natarajan & Amanda Hoffmeister, Do No Harm: Can Health
Care Live Up to It?, TENN. TECH. U., http://www.tntech.edu/mayberry/noharm/
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
12. See id. (noting that the different entities involved in healthcare may
use different definitions for error and quality in healthcare).
13. See Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 197–204 (analyzing
the role that electronic medical records can play in reducing medical errors).
14. Ahern, supra note 3; Sidney Taurel, Chairman & CEO Eli Lilly & Co.,
The Health Care Conundrum: A Call for Leadership, Remarks at the Indiana
University Kelley School of Business Annual Business Conference (Mar. 8,
2006) (on file with authors). A lack of understanding of patterns of error and
lack of communication is often the culprit in causing medical errors, as opposed to purely individual human mistakes. Tom Murphy, Clarian Plans
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units were acceptable, for example, in the airline and banking
industries, the result would be two dangerous landings per day
at O’Hare International Airport and 32,000 checks deducted
from the wrong accounts every hour.15 When one considers
what is at risk, the high medical error rates in the United
States become especially difficult to excuse. Yet those high
rates persist.
In order to slash the “unconscionable” rate of medical errors and thereby improve healthcare quality, HCPs should
make greater use of mistake-proofing regimens that feature,
among other things, the application of lean-manufacturing
techniques borrowed from industry.16 Mistake-proofing is defined as “the use of process or design features to prevent errors
or the negative impact of errors.”17 It has been employed in domains other than healthcare with significant success.18 With
most serious medical errors likely resulting from systems failures as opposed to the failure of single individuals,19 devising
means of preventing process errors would be a logical course of
Training Center, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Apr. 3, 2006, at A3 (supporting the
opening of a simulation training center for health care professionals).
15. Ahern, supra note 3. For another instructive comparison, consider
that in the era of total-quality management (TQM) and Six-Sigma thinking,
many business organizations strive to limit errors to 3.4 defects per million
ISIXSIGMA
MAG.,
opportunities.
See
What
is
Six
Sigma?,
http://www.isixsigma.com/sixsigma/six_sigma.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2012)
(identifying Six Sigma as a quality measure that “strives for near perfection”).
16. John R. Grout & John S. Toussaint, Mistake-Proofing Healthcare: Why
Stopping Processes May Be a Good Start, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 149, 150 (2010)
(recognizing the ability of an assembly line to stop at the push of a button is
sometimes the best reaction to a problem). Other possible approaches to reducing the number of medical errors include a changed delivery model, bettercrafted incentives for HCPs, a modified tort liability system, and greater use of
health information technology. See John W. Hill, Angela N. Aneiros & Paul R.
Hogan, Law and the Healthcare Crisis: The Impact of Medical Malpractice and
Payment Systems on Physician Compensation and Workload as Antecedents of
Physician Shortages—Analysis, Implications and Reform Solutions, 2010 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 91, 132–50. Except to the extent that such other approaches complement or otherwise constitute a component of a sound mistakeproofing program, discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article.
17. JOHN GROUT, MISTAKE-PROOFING THE DESIGN OF HEALTH CARE
PROCESSES 1 (2007), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/mistakeproof/mist
akeproofing.pdf.
18. See Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16 (showing how Toyota implements these concepts).
19. Lucian L. Leape, The Patient Safety Imperative, Presentation at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 3–4, 2008)
[hereinafter Leape Harvard Seminar Nov. 2008] (on file with authors).
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action. Doing so should also be highly desirable from the perspective of HCPs, given that medical errors may lead to malpractice lawsuits—something no HCP wants to face.20 This desirability is enhanced by evidence that mistake-proofing
techniques and technologies in many cases can be implemented
inexpensively and can hold the potential to improve return on
investment.21
Despite mistake-proofing’s desirability, HCPs tend to adopt
such processes slowly.22 Improvements in U.S. healthcare quality have likewise been slow—so slow that in 2009, Consumers
Union assigned a failing grade to the quality improvement efforts.23 In assigning that grade, Consumers Union noted the
problematic example that most hospitals did not adopt systems
and procedures known to prevent medication errors.24
What accounts for the slow adoption of mistake-proofing
processes in the healthcare setting? Inadequate regulatory efforts serve as one reason. For example, there is no national entity specifically charged with coordinating, tracking, and meaningfully encouraging patient safety improvements. The current
fragmented efforts along these lines fall short.25 Moreover,
20. See, e.g., Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 159–60 (pointing
out the high cost of medical malpractice claims). HCPs often tend not to be shy
about voicing their concerns over the supposed prevalence of malpractice lawsuits. See, e.g., id. (identifying malpractice liability as a “crisis” and a focal
point of the 2004 presidential campaign). In reality, the vast majority of medical errors—even those that result in harm to a patient—do not lead to malpractice litigation. See infra text accompanying notes 264–265. But it is true
that an error prevented is a potential lawsuit prevented.
21. GROUT, supra note 17, at 14–16.
22. See id. at 17–20, 23 (providing list of reasons why it is difficult to implement these processes in the healthcare setting). See also id. at iii (“[W]e
still have much more to do to improve patient safety . . . a little-known but
very promising approach to preventing medical errors . . . We have only
scratched the surface . . . as many other devices and applications are still in
the pipeline or have yet to be discovered and disseminated.”).
23. CONSUMERS UNION, TO ERR IS HUMAN—TO DELAY IS DEADLY 12–13
(2009) [hereinafter CONSUMERS UNION]. In 2000, the IOM suggested a goal of
reducing healthcare errors by fifty percent over five years. IOM, TO ERR IS
HUMAN, supra note 4, at 4. That goal went unachieved. AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
AHRQ Pub. No. 08-0040, 2007 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT, at
iv, 2 (2008).
24. CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 23, at 5–7. As will be seen, a sound
mistake-proofing program should include procedures and techniques designed
to prevent medication errors, which occur with surprising frequency. See infra
text accompanying notes 197–203, 256–257.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 114–121, 259–263.
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there is no true national system of accountability with sufficient quality transparency to enable healthcare consumers and
regulators to identify HCPs that commit abnormally large
numbers of errors and to create pressure for change.26
In addition, fear of legal liability serves as an impediment
to widespread adoption of mistake-proofing processes. The concern is that the implementation of mistake-proofing might be
used as evidence that such actions were possible but that HCPs
delayed in their implementation, with harm coming to the patient in the meantime.27 As will be seen, that concern is largely
unwarranted because of a key rule of evidence.28 But to the extent that the concern is there, it serves as an obstacle. Further,
even when mistake-proofing has been implemented, HCPs may
be reluctant to acknowledge the use of mistake-proofing and
share knowledge gained through its use with other HCPs.29
The fear is that such disclosure will result in enhanced expectations of quality and an attendant greater propensity for patients to bring malpractice lawsuits.30 That fear, too, is largely
off the mark31 but still serves as an impediment to broader use
of mistake-proofing measures.
This article addresses the key role that mistake-proofing
processes would play in medical error reduction if such processes were widely adopted. It also proposes ways in which obstacles to broad adoption may be ameliorated or eliminated. Part
II examines the nature, frequency, and severity of medical errors and provides background on the legal treatment extended
to them. Part III focuses on the causes of medical errors. In
Part IV, the article discusses mistake-proofing approaches and
principles and outlines particular applications to healthcare.
Part V examines impediments to the use of mistakeproofing techniques in healthcare. Some of these impediments
stem from a misunderstanding among healthcare providers
26. See infra note 115; infra text accompanying notes 259–263.
27. GROUT, supra note 17, at 17.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 207–231.
29. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 18 (highlighting the presence of many
examples of mistake-proofing solutions and approaches in the manufacturing
arena but the lack of available examples of mistake-proofing in the healthcare
field).
30. See id. at 17–18 (explaining that the contributors to the article of mistake-proofing examples wanted to remain anonymous, so as to not create liability).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 207–231, 237–238.
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about whether taking mistake-proofing steps somehow damages their interests and positions in litigation over alleged medical errors. In Part VI, this article offers recommendations for
increasing the use of mistake-proofing innovations in
healthcare and for overcoming the impediments to their broad
adoption.
II. NATURE OF MEDICAL ERRORS AND LEGAL
TREATMENT THEREOF
This section considers fundamental legal principles that
must be grasped if the desirability of mistake-proofing medicine is to be fully understood. Any discussion of medical errors
and the legal treatment they receive must begin with the
recognition that the occurrence of an adverse medical event—
an instance in which treatment administered to a patient
yielded a bad outcome—does not necessarily mean that a medical error was committed.32 What, then, is a medical error, and
when does it furnish the basis for legal liability?
Medical error may be defined as an HCP’s act of “commission or . . . omission . . . that would have been judged wrong by
skilled and knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred.”33 Liability may be imposed on the HCP (or HCPs) when the error
caused the patient to experience a harmful outcome.34 The immediately preceding statements regarding actionable medical
errors contemplate the controlling effect of negligence principles, which govern most instances of liability in the healthcare
32. See e.g., KENNETH R. WING, LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 291–92
(6th ed. 2003) (pointing out that very few adverse events implicate the res ipsa
loquitar doctrine). The flipside is also true—i.e., not all medical errors result
in harm to the patient.
33. Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in
Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 770
(1997). Given the process nature of healthcare, the key question for liability
purposes will often be whether an HCP’s actions or omissions deviated so
much from those that are usual and customary as to constitute a “process variation.” JOHN D. BANJA, MEDICAL ERRORS AND MEDICAL NARCISSISM 6 (2005).
34. E.g., J. STUART SHOWALTER, THE LAW OF HEALTHCARE
ADMINISTRATION 40–41 (4th ed. 2004) (illustrating the deference given to decisions by medical professionals); WING, supra note 32, at 291–92 (stating that
a patient must be able to show both actual and proximate causation for the
harmful outcome to establish liability for negligence). Because legal principles
focus on the intersection of an error and an adverse event in which patient
harm occurs, it may be useful to characterize potential liability-triggering instances as preventable adverse events. Saul N. Weingart, The Nature of Error
in Health Care, Presentation at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in
Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) (notes on file with authors).

LANGVARDT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

396

2/11/2013 11:38 AM

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 14:1

arena and many instances of liability in other professional or
business-oriented contexts.35
A. NEGLIGENCE AND THE REASONABLE-CARE FOCUS
Negligence cases revolve around the proposition that the
defendant failed to fulfill a duty of reasonable care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, with the plaintiff suffering harm as a
result.36 The reasonable-care concept calls for the actions or inactions of the defendant to be measured against those of the
hypothetical reasonable person of ordinary prudence.37 The
plaintiff will seek to demonstrate that a reasonable person
would not have done what the defendant did, or would have
done what the defendant failed to do.38 If the plaintiff proves
such a breach of duty on the part of the defendant and demonstrates the existence of a sufficient causation link between the
defendant’s failure to use reasonable care and the harm experienced by the plaintiff, the defendant will be held liable for negligence.39
The basic negligence principles outlined in the preceding
paragraph are applied in a very broad range of settings.40 The
myriad of potential applications of negligence principles include, for instance, the product liability context. Manufacturers
may face liability if they adopted a product design that substantially increased the risk of harm to product users (including the injured plaintiff) and was a design that reasonable
manufacturers would not adopt.41 Similarly, negligence liability
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A & cmts. a–c (1965)
(“[O]ne who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or
trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.”).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 281 cmt. c, illus.
1–3, cmt. e, 283 cmts. b–c, 284 cmt. a, 285 cmts. e–f, cmt. g & illus. 1–7, 289
cmt. j, illus. 5–6, cmt. k, illus. 7–8, cmt. m, illus. 9–14.
37. WING, supra note 32, at 290–91.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 282–83, 284,
299A (defining the standard for reasonable behavior, which may include either
an act or a failure to act).
39. Id. §§ 281–83, 328A–B.
40. See, e.g., id. §§ 281 cmt. c, illus. 1–3, cmt. e, 283 cmts. b–c, 284 cmt. a,
285 cmts. e–f, cmt. g & illus. 1–7, 289 cmt. j, illus. 5–6, cmt. k, illus. 7–8, cmt.
m, illus. 9–14, 299A cmts. a–e.
41. See id. §§ 298 cmt. b, 299 & cmt. e, 299A & cmts. a–e, 300 & cmt. c; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1 cmt. a, 2(b)–
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may follow if a manufacturer utilized a production process that
a reasonable manufacturer would not employ, and the process
led to an injury-causing product defect.42
The professional liability context is another one of the
many settings to which negligence principles are applied. Although the term “malpractice” is often used when a harmed patient sues a physician or other HCP, or when an aggrieved client sues an attorney, negligence is the legal theory that nearly
always controls the case.43 In the healthcare context, the key
questions are whether the HCP acted as a reasonable HCP44
would have under the circumstances, and if not, whether that
failure to exercise due care caused—or helped to cause—the
harm suffered by the plaintiff.45
For example, assuming the existence of the causation link
just noted, a physician could be at risk of liability if she adopted
a course of treatment that a similarly situated reasonable physician would not adopt.46 The same would be true if the physician failed to diagnose a patient’s serious illness until long after
a reasonable physician would have made the diagnosis.47 Consider, too, the example of the nurse who failed to follow a physician’s orders regarding a patient’s treatment (something the
reasonable nurse would not do, absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances). If the patient suffered harm as a result,
the nurse could face negligence liability.48 So might a nurse
who fails to pick up on obvious signs of patient distress when a
(c) cmts. a, b (1998).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 298 cmt. b,
299 & cmt. e, 299A & cmts. a–e, 300 & cmt. c; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1998).
43. E.g., WING, supra note 32, at 290–91. Seldom do malpractice cases
present claims of intentional or reckless wrongdoing, as opposed to negligence.
John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 621 (2005)
(discussing implications of caps on damages in medical malpractice cases).
44. The previously noted definition of medical error, see supra text accompanying note 33, applies this “reasonable HCP” concept by comparing
what the HCP under scrutiny did or did not do to what “skilled and knowledgeable peers” would or would not have done. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 165–66; Wu et al., supra note 33, at 770.
45. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 165–68.
46. E.g., SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 40–43 (reviewing the reasonable
physician standard, the locality rule, the school rule, and reasonable prudence
standard).
47. E.g., Jones v. Speed, 577 A.2d 64, 67–70 (Md. 1990) (brain tumor).
48. See JAMES WALKER SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY §§ 4.04[1], 10.05[1][a],
11.02[2]–[3], 11.04[1] (rev. ed. 2005).
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reasonable nurse would have noted such signs and reacted accordingly.49 Of course, these same principles apply to individual
HCPs other than doctors and nurses if they cause harm to patients through actions or inactions that fall below the due-care
standard appropriate to their position.50
It is important to recall, however, that the mere proof of a
bad outcome for a patient is not by itself sufficient for the imposition of negligence liability on HCPs involved in the patient’s care.51 After all, the HCPs may have provided the nature
and type of treatment that was reasonable under the circumstances. In such a situation, there is no breach of duty and thus
no basis for negligence liability, despite the bad outcome.52
B. IMPUTED LIABILITY AND DIRECT LIABILITY
The previously noted examples of malpractice liability involved individual defendants such as doctors and nurses. Of
course, hospitals and other organizational HCPs may also face
liability. One of two grounds, and sometimes both grounds, may
be used to establish liability. The first method is imputed liability under respondeat superior, a doctrine that calls for the hospital or other organizational defendant to be held liable for the
negligence of its employees if that negligence occurred within
the scope of employment.53 The other method is direct liability,
under which the organizational HCP is held liable for its own
failure to use reasonable care.54
Consider, for instance, the previously noted examples of
negligence on the part of a nurse in caring for a patient. As-

49. See id. § 11.02[2]–[3].
50. WING, supra note 32, at 289–91 (explaining the different standard of
conduct that is applied to medical professionals). As will be seen, an institutional HCP such as a hospital may face liability as well in some such instances. See infra text accompanying notes 53–60.
51. See WING, supra note 32, at 291–93 (emphasizing that the patient
must be able to show a breach of the duty of care by the HCP and also must
show both actual and proximate causation).
52. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, §§ 281, 283,
328A. Of course, a lawsuit may still be filed in such an instance—particularly
if the outcome is extremely bad—but there should be no liability if there was
no failure to use reasonable care.
53. SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.01–02. The same rule applies with regard to
employers generally. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
54. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 166 & n.40 (explaining the
corporate negligence doctrine that provides for direct liability of hospitals).
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suming that the nurse was an employee of a hospital or another
organizational HCP, the nurse would not be the only liable party. The hospital or other organizational HCP serving as the
nurse’s employer would also be liable on an imputed basis under respondeat superior.55 In such scenarios, the employer is
not really at fault; the employee is. However, the public policy
considerations underlying respondeat superior support a rule
that the employer—normally the recipient of the benefit of an
employee’s service—may have to bear some of the burdens associated with the employee’s mistakes.56
In other situations, the hospital or other organizational
HCP may be at fault and therefore may face direct liability for
its own negligence. Assume, for example, that a hospital’s established procedure regarding administration of narcotics
proves inadequate to prevent a dosage error and the resulting
harm to a patient. The hospital is likely to be held directly liable for negligence if a reasonable hospital would have adopted a
different procedure that substantially reduced the risk of harm
to patients.57 The “would have adopted a different [procedure]”
statement is important, because it underscores the key role
that the failure to take certain precautionary actions may play
in furnishing the basis for negligence liability.58
The above discussion suggests two important and often related characteristics of many instances of negligence liability in

55. SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.01–02. The respondeat superior rule is more
likely to serve as a basis for the hospital to be held liable when the negligent
person was a nurse than when he or she was a physician. Id. Nurses are typically employees, whereas physicians usually are independent contractors with
hospital admission privileges. If the physician is an independent contractor,
respondeat superior would not make the hospital liable. Id. Of course, a physician who is a hospital employee (e.g., a hospitalist), respondeat superior would
come into play and would expose the hospital to liability in the event of the
employee’s negligence. See id.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 228–229 (1958) (limiting the employer’s liability to actions performed by the employee within the
scope of employment).
57. See SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.03[1]. The “corporate negligence” contemplated here may take a variety of forms, with the hospital being held liable
for its own failure to use reasonable care (not, as in the respondeat superior
setting, for its employees’ negligence). SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 129;
SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.03[1]. Of course, depending upon the facts of the
particular case, it is possible that a hospital could face both direct liability for
its own negligence and respondeat superior liability because its employees
were negligent as well. See id. §§ 3.01–02, 3.03[1].
58. SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 129 (focusing on failures to provide adequate accommodations and facilities); SMITH, supra note 48, § 3.03[1].
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healthcare settings: the group errors characteristic and the system errors characteristic. Medical errors that give rise to negligence liability often involve the actions of more than one party,
as opposed to a single HCP who fails to exercise reasonable
care.59 To take an example of an egregious error, consider the
surgeon who amputates the patient’s right leg instead of the
left. The surgeon presumably failed to use reasonable care. But
other HCPs involved in the patient’s care during the preoperative stage may well have failed to take reasonable steps to
help ensure that the correct leg was amputated. In that sense,
the medical mistake was a group error. Depending on the facts,
it may also be a system error. If, for instance, the hospital did
not have a simple policy requiring clear pre-surgery marking of
the body part, we can add to the mix a system error that makes
the hospital directly liable in addition to individual HCPs who
were negligent.60
Because negligence liability is premised on harm-causing
mistakes that fall below the standard of due care, mistakeproofing efforts of the sort discussed in this article make a
great deal of sense in the healthcare environment. They are designed to lessen the likelihood of harm-causing medical errors,
and they relate directly to the individual-error, group-error,
and system-error aspects of the negligence liability environment faced by HCPs. Moreover, they typically do not carry a
hefty price tag and are relatively easy to implement.61 But
HCPs have not adopted such processes as broadly as might be
expected. Later parts of the article will address reasons for this
state of affairs and propose ways to expand the use of mistakeproofing processes. First, however, we devote further attention
in the following part to the causes of medical errors.
III. CAUSES OF MEDICAL ERRORS
A. THREE INTERTWINED CONSIDERATIONS
Given the high cost of healthcare in the United States, why
do medical errors occur with such frequency? Three often inter59. See infra text accompanying notes 194–203.
60. See SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 129 (including institutional errors
as a basis for negligence); SMITH, supra note 48, §§ 3.01–02, 3.03[1]; see also
supra notes 55, 57 (discussing respondeat superior liability and direct liability
for corporate negligence).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 172–193.
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twined considerations are notable. First, most errors are multifactorial and often involve both cognitive/knowledge and system/process failures.62 Second, most care is delivered through a
series of frequently complex processes that are often plagued
with a lack of consistency and a cultural dependence upon individuals.63 These considerations lead to variability in the quality
of delivery.64 Third, medicine involves both art and science and
requires subjective judgment, especially in the art component.65
Given that subjectivity, the predominant culture influences
both behaviors and outcomes.66 Underlying the medical culture
is a host of behavioral issues that contribute to medical errors
through various psychological and epistemological influences.67
When combined with the customary defensive responses by
HCPs to systemic failure and the absence of a comprehensive,
centralized system for measuring, tracking, and reporting errors, the three considerations identified above operate as barriers to reducing the incidence of medical errors. We now examine those considerations in more depth.
Most systems of complex, intrinsically hazardous processes
are accompanied by defenses against failure. After “repeated
experiences with failure . . . [,] system designers and operators . . . [usually] implement layers of defense[s] or redundancy
so that an error will be intercepted and its trajectory halted”
before harm results.68 Nonetheless, no matter how welldesigned processes are, some latent errors will still occur.69 A
key question that surfaces is whether the error was systemic
or, instead, the result of one person failing in some essential respect (“single-point failure”).70 In the healthcare context, such
62. Gordon Schiff, Understanding Diagnostic Errors, Presentation at
Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) (on
file with authors).
63. GROUT, supra note 17, at 19 (calling the reliance on individual perfection a perpetuation of a “myth of infallibility”).
64. Id. (lacking consistent processes inhibits the implementation of mistake-proofing).
65. See RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 8, at 68 (stating that discretion is
involved in medical decisions).
66. Id.
67. BANJA, supra note 33, at 15–16 (analogizing the topic of medical errors
to a spider web).
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. at 12.
70. See id. (distinguishing between system failures and individual errors
will not only establish liability, but it will also provide more focused correction).
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determinations become important for legal purposes because of
the manner in which teams providing medical care are structured.
In most settings, teams make fewer mistakes than do individuals, especially when all members of a team are cognizant of
each individual member’s responsibilities.71 It is important to
note that medical teams are often formed temporarily from various sources for single episodes of care. Some who become part
of the team for a given episode may be independent contractors
rather than employees of the healthcare facility where care is
provided. Physicians in a particular medical practice may furnish services as team members in a number of diverse contexts.
The members of these teams, however, are rarely trained together.72 They also may come from different disciplines and educational backgrounds.73 Further, team training in the medical
profession tends to be limited and insufficiently grounded in a
scientific understanding of the human factors that influence effective teamwork.74 It may also be haphazard.75 For example,
physicians frequently do not have a good grasp of how hospitals
function.76
At a more macro level, many hospitals have not focused on
error prevention. One hospital chief executive officer reportedly
stated that patient safety was not “on his radar screen” and described his job as “feeding the beast” (i.e., generating revenues).77 Noting this lack of focus on error prevention and reduction, a study that gave rise to a New England Journal of
Medicine article revealed troubling statistics. An estimated
3.7% of patients admitted to hospitals experience an adverse
event, 27.6% of these adverse events result from negligence,
and in approximately 25% of the negligently caused adverse
71. D.P. BAKER ET AL., MEDICAL TEAMWORK AND PATIENT SAFETY: THE
EVIDENCE-BASED RELATION 29 (2005).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 43.
75. See id. at 47 (calling for either a national error reporting system or
requiring participation in team training programs).
76. Leape, supra note 19. A floor comment by one physician during a medical seminar regarding the absence of teamwork is telling: “As someone working in the hospital, I don’t know what is going on. So much of the time no one
knows what is going on.” Weingart, supra note 34 (floor comment during
presentation).
77. Weingart, supra note 34.
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events, the patient dies.78 These results led to the conclusion
that “there is a substantial amount of injury to patients from
medical management, and many injuries are the result of substandard care.”79 Further, the problem of patient safety outside
the hospital setting is said to be as great as inside hospitals.80
B. MEDICAL ERROR AND BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNINGS
No discussion of the nature of medical error would be complete without some recognition of its behavioral underpinnings.81 In examining the psychology of medical error, insights
can be gleaned from a triad of cognitive models of human performance. Performance can be skill-based, rule-based, or
knowledge-based.82 Skilled-based performance often involves
unconscious, rapid, and effortless responses to demands.83
Rule-based performance involves the application of some algorithm or finite sequence of instructions, such as “if X occurs,
then do Y.” Knowledge-based performance involves the use of
novel problem-solving skills.84
Skill-based errors generally fall within the category of
what might be termed slips.85 Slips can be subcategorized to errors involving capture (familiarity with a similar behavior
overrides the appropriate behavior), description (similarity in
physical appearance or proximity of a wrong object to the correct object causes the wrong choice of behavior), associative activation (actor becomes distracted from task at hand), or loss of
activation (actor forgets purpose of the behavior).86 Rule-based
78. T.A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of Harvard Medical Practice Study, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 370, 371, 373 (1991) (reporting results of a study analyzing randomly sampled hospital records from New York hospitals).
79. Id. at 370.
80. David W. Bates, Welcoming Remarks at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 3–4, 2008) (on file with authors).
81. For a detailed discussion of the cognitive influences on preventable
adverse events, see Jiajie Zhang et al., A Cognitive Taxonomy of Medical Errors, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 193, 193–202 (2004).
82. The Psychology of Human Error, HUM. FACTORS MD (June 8, 2010),
http://www.humanfactorsmd.com/psychology-of-human-error/.
83. See id. (classifying skills as automatic).
84. Id.
85. Id. (occurring typically when an individual’s attention is diverted).
86. Weingart, supra note 34. An example of a capture error is “when a
nurse misprograms a new infusion pump because the sequence of steps is similar, but not identical to the pump he is most familiar with.” The Psychology of
Human Error, supra note 82. “[W]hen the wrong control on an EKG is adjust-
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and knowledge-based errors are often termed mistakes.87 Rulebased errors occur when the wrong rule is applied.88
Knowledge-based mistakes may occur because of various common thinking tendencies. These include: memory biases (including such ones as choice-supportive bias, the recall of prior
options chosen over options rejected); availability heuristics
(predicting the frequency of an event based upon how easily an
example can be brought to mind); confirmation bias (a tendency
to search for or interpret new information in a way that confirms one’s prior preferences or attitudes); and overconfidence
(having greater faith in one’s knowledge or ability than is warranted).89 Each of these factors can lead to erroneous decisions
and actions in the healthcare setting.
The problem of impaired providers sometimes also contributes to the causation of preventable adverse events. Impaired
providers are those physicians or other medical personnel who
are unable to fulfill their professional responsibilities properly
because of physical or psychological illness or because of substance abuse.90 Evidence indicates that between eight and fifteen percent of providers are impaired in one or more of the
senses just noted (a figure similar to what is found in the general population).91 Substance abuse problems and behavioral
disorders92 can interfere with healthcare quality in various
ways. For example, an HCP’s substance abuse can lead to a
failure to record important information in a patient’s chart and
eventual harm to the patient, as well as severely compromising
the affected HCP’s ability to exercise sound medical judg-

ed because it’s close to other controls that look the same” is an example of a
descriptive error. Id. When a “radiologist[] forget[s] what he is looking for after
retrieving and displaying a comparison study” qualifies as a loss of activation
error. Id.
87. The Psychology of Human Error, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. Weingart, supra note 34.
90. Booker T. Bush, The Physician Who Becomes Impaired, Presentation
at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 2008)
(on file with authors).
91. Id.
92. These may include, for instance, boundary violations such as selling
drug samples or engaging in sexual relations with co-workers, disruptive behaviors such as throwing scalpels and yelling at other members of the medical
team, and even outright dishonesty such as taking advantage of patients for
financial gain. Id.
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ment.93 Disruptive behaviors can adversely affect morale and
create workplace frictions.94 The result may be an unhealthy
culture that enhances the risk of error on the part of distracted
or intimidated individuals or, as the following discussion indicates, undermines checks against error.95
C. OTHER CAUSES OF MEDICAL ERRORS
Contemporary research suggests that catastrophic patientcare adverse events usually involve various people “committing
multiple, often seemingly innocuous, mistakes that . . . breach
an organization’s fail-safe mechanisms.”96 In an environment
such as the frequently chaotic team setting in healthcare, the
likelihood of errors increases because the lack of a sound organizational culture results in compliance failures becoming normalized.97 The causes of such normalization of corrupted prac-

93. In other instances, there may have been no substance abuse on the
part of a provider of medical services but the provider may be similarly impaired for a simple reason: fatigue. The problem of provider fatigue may help
to answer a question posed by a physician commentator: “Why are so many
mistakes made doing things that are routine in medicine?” Christopher P.
Landrigan, Fatigue and Error: Achieving Evidence-Based Schedule Improvements, Presentation at Harvard Medical School Seminar: Progress in Patient
Safety (Nov. 2008) (on file with authors). There is empirical evidence that physicians’ often exhaustive work schedules contribute to the incidence of medical
errors. See Njib T. Ayas et al., Extended Work Duration and the Risk of SelfReported Percutaneous Injuries in Interns, 296 JAMA 1055, 1059–60 (2006)
(finding that extended work hours were associated with an increased risk of
percutaneous injuries); Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Effect of Reducing Interns’ Work Hours on Serious Medical Errors in Intensive Care Units, 351 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1838, 1838–39, 1842–44 (2004) (finding that interns made thirtyfive percent more medical errors of a serious nature, and five times more diagnostic errors, on a traditional work schedule than on a schedule reflecting reduced work hours). Despite promulgation of standards for work hours by the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), there is far
from universal compliance with the standards. Christopher P. Landrigan et
al., Interns’ Compliance with Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education Work-Hour Limits, 296 JAMA 1063, 1063–64, 1065–66 (2006) (“83.6% of
participating interns reported working hours that were noncompliant with the
ACGME duty-hour standards . . . .”). Given the busy schedules of many physicians, it seems likely that fatigue may also be a problem well after they complete their training.
94. Bush, supra note 90.
95. Id.
96. John Banja, The Normalization of Deviance in Health Care Delivery,
53 BUS. HORIZONS 139, 139 (2010).
97. See id. at 139–41 (noticing that the normalized behavior may not directly cause harm, but potentially creates a weakness in the system when a
future error does occur).
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tices are found in the phenomena of socialization, institutionalization, and rationalization.98 Socialization, usually mediated
by an informal system of rewards and punishments, operates to
determine when an organizational newcomer is fully accepted
into a particular group.99 Institutionalization exposes newcomers to deviant behaviors, often performed by authority figures.100 Rationalization enables participants in care delivery
systems to convince themselves and others that departures
from compliant practices are not only legitimate but often even
necessary to ensure proper care.101
Earlier discussion noted that negligence liability may be
imposed when a medical error results from a failure to use reasonable care.102 Despite this prospect of liability, the tort system has not effectively coerced HCPs into creating, implementing, and enforcing the effective use of mistake-proofing
principles and techniques. One reason may be a characteristic
of some physicians’ psyche: a narcissism that blocks full ac98. Id. at 141.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Common noncompliant practices in patient care settings include:
“not washing or sanitizing hands sufficiently; not gowning up or skipping some
other infection-control procedures; not changing gloves when appropriate; failing to check armbands; not performing safety checks; using abbreviations; not
getting required approval before acting; and violating policies on storing or
dispensing medications.” Id. at 140. In an example of normalization of a departure from standard practice in a surgical setting, a medical student observing a surgery reported that:
[T]he surgeon inadvertently touched the tip of the instrument he was
using to his plastic face mask. Instead of his requesting or being offered a sterile replacement, he just froze for a few seconds while everyone else in the operating room stared at him. The surgeon then continued operating. Five minutes later he did it again and still no one
did anything.
Id. When the medical student later asked a nurse about what had happened,
the nurse called it “no big deal” and added that “[w]e’ll just load the patient
with antibiotics and he’ll do fine.” Id. The patient was given antibiotics and
did recover well. Id. However, tragic results—a patient’s death—occurred in
an instance involving a combination of an individual’s mistake and a noncompliant act by others. After turning off a surgical patient’s ventilator because
the surgeon wanted to take an x-ray, an anesthesiologist forgot to turn the
ventilator back on for significantly longer than the few seconds the ventilator
was to be off. Id. at 140–41. It was later discovered that an alarm meant to
alert the anesthesiologist regarding the ventilator problem had been disabled,
“possibly because the operating room staff found the constant beeping [of the
alarm] irritating and annoying.” Id. at 141.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 36–52.
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ceptance of the notion that compliance rules apply to physicians. Long recognized as the most dominant players in care
delivery,103 physicians are also very much in a position to dominate the culture of care delivery. This power, if coupled with a
narcissistic tendency, may lead to feelings of arrogance and being “special.”104
In addition, physicians are trained in a culture in which
disclosure of errors—even to peers—is regarded as an indication of weakness.105 This makes admission of errors difficult.
Physicians are naturally inclined to import their feelings and
proclivities into practice settings.106 When this tendency is
combined with physicians’ dominant positions in care delivery,
there emerges fertile ground for a culture that resists error
admission and causal identification. One physician has stated
that narcissism led him to believe he had total control, to attribute his mistakes to others, to refuse to resolve tensions with
others, to reject new ideas, and to cling rigidly to his original
attitudes.107 He saw the same tendencies, beliefs, and behaviors
in other physicians.108 Given the gravity and high stakes often
associated with the healthcare setting, rationalizing and not
acknowledging their mistakes may offer physicians a relief
from the angst that error disclosure could create.109 It therefore
stands to reason that the threat of legal liability is somewhat
limited in its ability to curb mistakes and cause behavioral
changes in people who externalize blame rather than admit
mistakes.
The prospect of avoiding negligence liability has not had
the seemingly logical effect of spurring HCPs to adopt mistakeproofing processes on a wider scale. However, concern about po-

103. See Andrew K. Dolan, Antitrust Law and Physician Dominance of
Other Health Practitioners, 4 J. HEALTH POL’Y 675, 679 (1980) (discussing the
dominant position physicians are in when controlling the approval of applications for hospital privileges); see also Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum,
NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 44 (noting the incentive doctors have to prioritize financial gains over patient-centered care).
104. BANJA, supra note 33, at 50 (listing the DSM-IV traits for the narcissistic personality disorder).
105. Id. at 29.
106. Cf. id. at 15 (acknowledging that doctors’ thoughts and feelings impact
their communication with patients).
107. Id. at 54.
108. See id. (suggesting that similar behavior is encouraged in other doctors).
109. Id. at 47 (attempting to avoid liability).
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tential liability prompts many physicians to engage in what
they call “defensive medicine”—ordering tests and procedures
they would not otherwise order because of the fear of being
sued if they do not order those tests and procedures.110 Defensive medicine has been estimated to cause, on a national basis,
seventy billion dollars per year in unnecessary treatment
costs.111 As will be seen in later analysis, the actual need to engage in such defensive medicine likely is not as great as many
physicians perceive it to be. This erroneous perception may result from a misunderstanding concerning what negligence law
really provides and from physicians’ overestimation of their
chances of being sued, let alone being held liable.112 Rather
than being preoccupied with the supposed need to engage in defensive medicine, HCPs would do far more to protect themselves against liability by making greater use of mistakeproofing processes and techniques.113
The failure of medicine to make substantial progress in reducing medical errors across most of its disciplines114 can also
110. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609,
2609 (2005) (differentiating between “positive” and “negative” defensive medicine). Various commentators have noted the defensive medicine concerns held
by critics of the current legal regime. E.g., William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice Premiums?, 13 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 465, 476–77 (2004) (“Physicians have come to believe that every
patient is a potential lawsuit.”). Other commentators regard the defensive
medicine concerns as overblown. E.g., Kenneth C. Chessick & Matthew D.
Robinson, Medical Negligence Litigation Is Not the Problem, 26 N. ILL. L. REV.
563, 570, 574 (2006) (emphasizing that “insurance companies are paying out
less in claims each year, despite charging more in premiums” and that defensive medicine is not a shield from liability); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver,
The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability
Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 937–38
(2005) (“The difficulty in proving the causal link between malpractice exposure
and higher levels of defensive medicine arises from the multitude of motives
providers may have for performing ‘unnecessary’ tests and procedures . . . .”).
For further analysis of the supposed defensive medicine problem, see infra
text accompanying notes 232–241.
111. MASS. MED. SOC’Y, INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN
MASSACHUSETTS 1 (2008).
112. See infra text accompanying note 237.
113. See infra text accompanying note 239.
114. However, anesthesiology serves as an example of mistake-proofing being applied in a medical discipline with great success. See Hyman & Silver,
supra note 110, at 917–23. Anesthesia safety improved significantly after a
professional body promulgated patient monitoring guidelines and anesthesiologists implemented them. See id. at 920. As a further result, anesthesiologists’
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be attributed, in part, to the absence of a national entity sufficiently empowered to engage in comprehensive tracking of
HCPs’ adoption, or lack of adoption, of safety measures.115 More
than half of the states require reporting of medical errors,116
but meaningful reduction in the number of errors remains an

insurance premiums remained relatively flat (unlike those of other specialties). See id. at 918. This suggests that mistake-proofing can be helpful in reducing HCPs’ oft-voiced complaints about the costs of malpractice insurance.
See Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 159. There remains a question,
however, about why other medical specialties have not embraced mistakeproofing principles and techniques to achieve similar results. Hyman & Silver
note that “[m]any providers have failed to adopt patient safety measures of
proven effectiveness, and they have similarly failed to use information already
in their possession to protect patients from harm.” Hyman & Silver, supra
note 110, at 991.
115. This is not to say that the federal government has ignored patient
safety issues. Federal law calls for the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop a “national strategy to improve the delivery of health
care services, patient health outcomes, and population health.” 42 U.S.C. §
280j (2006). Ways of improving healthcare quality are among the matters to be
addressed in that strategy. Id. An agency housed within HHS, the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), engages in educational efforts consistent with its name and seeks to promote quality enhancements through reports and recommendations. See Advancing Excellence in Healthcare, AGENCY
FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/ (last visited Sept. 29,
2012); see also, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT (2012), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
qual/nhqr11/nhqr11.pdf (annual report issued by AHRQ); GROUT, supra note
17, at 1 (AHRQ-sponsored report); AHRQ Innovations Exchange, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY , http://www.innovations.ahrq.gov/(last visited
Sept. 29, 2012) (AHRQ-provided tips). The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to 26 (2006), calls for an AHRQadministered process by which public or private organizations may choose to
form patient safety organizations (PSOs). Id. §§ 299b-21, 24. HCPs participating in PSOs may choose to provide the PSOs confidential reports on medical
errors and events that bear adversely on patient safety, with such reports being barred from discovery and evidentiary use in cases in which plaintiffs attempt to have the HCPs held liable for the alleged errors. Id. § 299b-22. The
PSOs then report such information for inclusion, on an anonymous basis, in
databases designed to lead to the enhancement of health quality and patient
safety. Id. §§ 299b-23 to 24. See generally Patient Safety Organizations and
Patient Safety Work Product, 42 C.F.R. § 3 (2009) (listing regulations promulgated pursuant to Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 in order to implement statute). These efforts are both useful and commendable, but
the voluntary nature of both PSO creation and error-reporting by HCPs means
that the information acquired by the AHRQ and available for inclusion in the
databases is less complete, and therefore less useful, than it might be.
116. See National Survey, supra note 5, at 207, 213. For discussion of such
statutes, their similarities, and their differences, see id. at 213–22. Details of
the state error-reporting systems are beyond the scope of this article.
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elusive goal.117 The usefulness of the information obtained
through the state error-reporting systems that do exist is impaired by chronic under-reporting of errors.118 Moreover, there
is no comprehensive national system of mandatory errorreporting,119 despite recommendations by the IOM and commentators that such a system be adopted.120 It therefore becomes difficult to track progress in error reduction even if such
progress is being made.121
As the foregoing discussion has revealed, medical errors
stem from various causes, including complex processes, chaotic
team environments, behavioral factors, and imperfect defensive
measures. Moreover, those measures fail because of several factors, including flawed institutional cultures that undermine
safeguards, physician narcissism that may create a resistance
to quality improvements, and the absence of a well-coordinated,
centralized system of error reporting and safety improvement
tracking. What, then, can be done to improve healthcare quality? The following section turns to the potentially efficacious
remedy of applying mistake-proofing theory and techniques to
reduce the incidence of preventable adverse events.
IV. MISTAKE-PROOFING: ATTRIBUTES AND
APPLICATIONS TO HEALTHCARE
Citing examples of “normalized-deviance” situations in

117. See id. at 202, 206–07.
118. Id. at 213–14. Likely reasons for the under-reporting include lenient
failure-to-report penalties in some states, budgetary constraints that limit the
resources devoted by the state to checking on whether errors were reported,
and fears on the part of HCPs that their reporting of an error could be used
against them in malpractice litigation, despite the liability protections typically present in the states’ laws. Id. at 215–19.
119. As noted earlier, federal law generally contemplates a voluntary reporting regime. See supra note 115. In the Medicare and Medicaid contexts,
however, hospitals must report on numerous measures of quality, including
certain types of medical errors, in order to receive a full updated payment
from the government in the following fiscal year. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2009 QUALITY MEASURE REPORTING FOR 2010
PAYMENT UPDATE 1 (2010), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov
/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HospitalRHQDAPU200808.pdf [hereinafter
QUALITY MEASURE REPORTING].
120. See IOM, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 4, at 86–87; see also, e.g., Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: What
Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 2384 (2005).
121. CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 23, at 6–8.
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which seemingly innocuous process failures and mistakes become commonplace, some commentators advise erecting as
many barriers as possible to errors.122 The reason is not that
holes in the defensive barriers to error are unavoidable; rather
the holes are an artifact of institutional rigidity and the organization’s failure to learn from experience because of the factors
enumerated in the previous section.123 Such organizations have
been called “slow learners, slow improvers, slow innovators,
and ultimately sluggish competitors.”124 Given the complexities
associated with such causes of error as chaotic team environments and physician narcissism, defenses based on changing
human nature are often less effective than mistake-proofing.
Speaking in regard to an industry other than healthcare but offering a useful suggestion for the medical context, one commentator asserts:
The old way of dealing with human error was to scold people, retrain
them, and tell them to be more careful . . . My view is that you can’t
do much to change human nature, and people are going to make mistakes. If you can’t tolerate [error,] you should remove the opportunities for error.125

In healthcare, this means changing the design of care delivery.
The IOM has stated that “[h]ealth care has safety and quality
problems because it relies on outmoded systems of work. Poor
designs set the workforce up to fail, regardless of how hard they
try. If we want safer, higher-quality care, we will need to have
redesigned systems of care.”126 Both the United States and
122.
123.
124.
125.

See, e.g., STEVEN J. SPEAR, CHASING THE RABBIT 49 (2009).
See id.
Id.
George Labar, Can Ergonomics Cure ‘Human Error’?, OCCUPATIONAL
HAZARDS, Apr. 1996, at 48. It is common to blame employees individually for
error and assume that experienced employees need additional training because they have forgotten what should be done. Human Factors Process for
Reducing Maintenance Errors, AERO MAG., http://www.boeing.com/commercial
/aeromagazine/aero_03/textonly/m01txt.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). Boeing has termed this phenomenon the “blame and training” cycle, in which
workers learn nothing new and errors are therefore likely to recur. Id. Other
commentators have termed this the “blame, shame, and train” cycle which
helps cause well-intentioned professionals who are placed in poorly designed
systems to commit the same errors redundantly. See, e.g., Hans Kim, Root
Cause and Failure Mode/Effects Analysis, Presentation at Harvard Medical
School Seminar: Progress in Patient Safety (Nov. 2008) (on file with authors);
Leape Harvard Seminar Nov. 2008, supra note 19.
126. INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM 4 (2001). Recommending changing the design of health care systems to improve patient safety, a
commentator notes:
Being careful helps, but it brings us nowhere near perfection . . . . The

LANGVARDT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

412

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/11/2013 11:38 AM

[Vol. 14:1

United Kingdom governments have called for improving the
safety of healthcare through changing the physical design of
hospitals and other similar healthcare facilities.127
Redesigning care systems promises to be no small task,
however, especially considering that design changes in physical
environments are relatively infrequent. Consequently, a
framework is necessary to guide systems redesign. The solution
needs to employ diverse tools that help ensure healthcare
workers know what to do differently and that provide a vocabulary of error-avoidance responses.128 Mistake-proofing furnishes
a systems design framework that meets these criteria. Often
referred to as “error-proofing,”129 “poka-yoke,”130 and “failsafing,”131 mistake-proofing consists of concepts that help formulate design changes to reduce human error and that involve
the use of process and design features. There is evidence that
healthcare organizations are beginning to discover the benefits
of lean-manufacturing techniques, such as those used by Toyota as part of its mistake-proofing efforts.132
A. A TYPOLOGY OF APPROACHES
As a starting point for understanding the potential for mis-

remedy is in changing systems of work. The remedy is in design . . . . The goal should be extreme safety. I believe we should be as
safe in our hospitals as we are in our homes. But we cannot reach
that goal through exhortation, censure, outrage, and shame. We can
reach it only by commitment to change, so that normal, human errors
can be made irrelevant to outcome, continually found, and skillfully
mitigated.
Donald Berwick, Not Again! Preventing Errors Lies in Redesign—Not Exhortation, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 247, 247–48 (2001).
127. J. B. Battles, Quality and Safety by Design, 15 QUALITY & SAFETY IN
HEALTH CARE (Supp. 1) i1, i1-3 (2006); see also DESIGN COUNCIL, DEP’T OF
HEALTH,
DESIGN
FOR
PATIENT
SAFETY
(2003),
http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/Documents/Documents/Publications/Health/D
esign%20for%20Patient%20Safety_Design_Council.pdf.
128. See Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16, at 150.
129. MARK GRABAN, LEAN HOSPITALS: IMPROVING QUALITY, PATIENT
SAFETY, AND EMPLOYEE SATISFACTION 139 (2009).
130. SHIGEO SHINGO, ZERO QUALITY CONTROL: SOURCE INSPECTION AND
THE POKA-YOKE SYSTEM 45 (1986); Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16, at 151.
131. Richard B. Chase & Douglas M. Stewart, Make Your Service Fail-Safe,
35 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 35, 35–43 (1994).
132. See Grout & Toussaint, supra note 16, at 150; see also Mark Graban,
Open Source “Lean Healthcare” Google Map, LEAN BLOG (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://www.leanblog.org/2009/08/open-source-lean-healthcare-google-map/.
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take-proofing to improve healthcare quality, we now briefly examine the various approaches that represent a general framework for its application. Professor Tsuda has developed a typology of approaches that, although not exhaustive, provides a
vocabulary for discussing mistake-proofing design. The approaches are: “(1) mistake prevention in the work environment;
(2) mistake detection; (3) mistake prevention” focused on detecting mistake sources; and (4) curtailment of the influence of
mistakes.133
Mistake prevention in the work environment involves making design changes that stop activities if an error is in process.134 Such prevention reduces complexity, ambiguity, vagueness, and uncertainty.135 Two basic design principles guide
mistake prevention in the work environment. The first is moderation of “wide and deep” task structures, with “wide” meaning multiple alternatives for a given decision and “deep” meaning a protracted series of choices.136 Humans normally perform
either moderately wide and deep tasks reasonably well, but the
likelihood of mistakes increases if tasks are both wide and
deep.137 Similarly, visual systems, also known as 5S (organization, orderliness, cleanliness, standardization, and discipline),
involve visually sharing information in work environments in
order to allow participants to know something important at a
glance.138
“Mistake detection identifies process errors found by inspecting the process after actions have been taken.”139 Alt-

133. Yoshikazu Tsuda, Implications of Fool Proofing in the Manufacturing
Process, in 16 QUALITY THROUGH ENGINEERING DESIGN 79, 80 (Way Kuo &
Marcia Martens Pierson eds., 1993).
134. SHINGO, supra note 130, at 99.
135. GROUT, supra note 17, at 5.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6.
138. See GWENDOLYN D. GALSWORTH, VISUAL SYSTEMS: HARNESSING THE
POWER OF A VISUAL WORKPLACE 4 (1997). The visual systems principle includes removing unneeded items from the workplace, arranging needed items
so that they are easy to find, reducing visual “noise,” institutionalizing improvements once made, and avoiding a return to past practices. Id. Consider
some examples of visual systems. Glidden EZ Tracks ceiling paint is pink
when wet but dries white. Glidden EZ Track Ceiling Paint, GLIDDEN,
http://www.glidden.com/pro/products/ez-track-ceiling-paint-pro.do (last visited
Oct. 19, 2012). Since painting a ceiling almost always involves painting over
old white paint, the pink color makes obtaining uniform coverage easier and
prevents mistakes. Id.
139. GROUT, supra note 17, at 7.
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hough obviously not as effective as mistake prevention,
knowledge that a mistake has been made will often permit remedial actions to be taken soon enough to avoid some of the
most undesirable results of the mistake.140 Data acquired from
inspections can also be used to reduce the occurrence of incorrect actions using a technique known as statistical process control, which indicates when processes are out of control.141 Other
mistake-detection techniques include successive checks, inspections of previous steps when a mistake is found at a subsequent
step, and self-checks that allow process participants to assess
the quality of their own work.142
Mistake prevention of the source-detection variety identifies problems found through process inspections before harmcausing errors can occur.143 Once a human has initiated a process, the process may perform an inspection itself.144 Design
changes that reduce or eliminate the consequences of the errors
are introduced.145 Airbags and guardrails are examples of preventing the influence of mistakes.146 These design features do
not stop automobile accidents from happening but are usually
preferable to the alternative that may result in their absence.147
A useful example of a mistake-prevention safety feature is
a device that reduces injuries from table saws. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission estimated that in 2001, there were
55,300 medically treated blade-contact injuries associated with

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Consider the example of Applied Bolting Technology’s directtension-indicating washers. See Direct Tension Indicator, APPLIED BOLTING
TECH.,
http://www.appliedbolting.com/direct-tension-indicator-boltingmethod.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). These washers are used to detect
when bolts have been torqued to the correct tension. Id. Each washer has
small indentations that are filled with orange polymer. Id. As the bolt is tightened, the indentations are flattened, squeezing the polymer to the edge of the
washer. Id. Properly tightened washers have a distinctive pattern of orange
polymer around them. Id. Visual inspection of the tightness can easily be accomplished. Id. More importantly, since the tightness criterion is apparent,
workers continue to tighten the bolt until proper tightness is achieved. Id.
This makes defects and rework very unlikely.
143. GROUT, supra note 17, at 9.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 13.
147. See id.
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table saw use.148 Fifteen percent of these instances resulted in
amputations and related costs of approximately $2.13 billion.149
An important mistake-proofing device is featured on SawStop™
table saws, which employ an electrically charged blade monitored by a signal processing unit in order to detect human flesh
coming in contact with the table saw blade.150 The voltage
drops when flesh contacts the blade, causing an aluminum
brake to be deployed.151 This stops the blade within five milliseconds.152 The safety device mounted on a table saw that is of
high quality in other respects has allowed the SawStop™ saw
to become the market’s best-selling cabinet saw despite a several hundred dollar price premium.153
SawStop™ also illustrates the use of purposeful design to
prevent the influence of mistakes because it dramatically reduces the severity of any resulting injury. Preventing the influence of mistakes involves either facilitation of mistake correction or decoupling of processes.154 Facilitating correction is
accomplished through planned responses when mistakes occur
in a manner analogous to auto-correct functions used in computers.155 Decoupling involves separating error-prone activities
at points where errors become irreversible.156 An example is the
deletion of email messages that can be later retrieved if needed.157
Both mistake prevention and mistake detection require
what are known as setting and control functions.158 Setting
functions differentiate between safe and unsafe conditions;
therefore, they are the mechanisms for determining that an er-

148. Memorandum from Page C. Faulk, Gen. Counsel, Jeffrey R. Williams,
Assistant Gen. Counsel for Enforcement and Info., and Hyun S. Kim, Attorney
Office of the Gen. Counsel, to Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n (June 28, 2006),
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia06/brief/tablesaw.pdf.
149. Id.
150. SawStop Table Saws are the Most Advanced Saws in the World, Setting the Standard for Table Saw Safety, SAWSTOP, http://www.sawstop.com/
howitworks/sawstop_whitepaper.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SawStop, SAWSTOP, http://www.sawstop.com (last visited Oct. 18,
2012).
154. GROUT, supra note 17, at 9.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Id. at 13.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 7, 9.
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ror has occurred or is about to occur.159 The more precise the
setting functions, the more extensive mistake-proofing can
be.160 Once a setting function determines that an error has occurred or is imminent, a control function signals the error.161
In 1999, Donald Berwick, then the president of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, delivered an address in
which he discussed a need for new tools to improve healthcare
quality. Making a statement that remains true today, he noted
that “[o]ur current tools can’t do the job. We can’t get where we
need to go by stressing the current system.”162 Berwick then offered an instructive example from a setting other than
healthcare. Restrooms in his workplace had signs that slide in
order to indicate whether the restroom was occupied or, instead, vacant.163 These signs were to be moved by the user upon
entering and leaving the facility. Berwick found the sign in the
correct position 61% of the time, with the most prevalent error
being the sign indicating “occupied” when the restroom was actually vacant.164 The result was that ignoring the sign could
lead to better outcomes than acting based on what the sign actually indicated.165 In an effort to solve this problem, he placed
on the door a handwritten sign that stated “Please flip the
sign.”166 After that sign was ignored, he placed on the door an
additional sign stating “Please read the sign (below) about flip159. Id. at 7.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 9. Setting functions are of four types: (1) physical—checks to ensure that physical attributes of a process are correct; (2) sequencing—checks
the precedence relationship of the process to ensure steps are in the correct
order; (3) grouping or counting—checks to ensure that matched sets of resources are available or that the correct number of repetitions has occurred;
and (4) information enhancement—assures that information required in the
process is available at the correct time and place and is salient to the user in
noisy environments. Id. Control and regulatory functions are also of four
types: (1) forced—physical size and shape or electronic controls detect and interdict the mistakes before it can occur, (2) shutdown—the entire process is
automatically stopped; (3) warning—a mistake is signaled but the process is
allowed to continue unless stopped by an operator; and (4) sensory alert—
some sensory cue signals ex post that a mistake has occurred or been acted
upon. Id. at 10.
162. DONALD M. BERWICK, ESCAPE FIRE: DESIGNS FOR THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE 34–35 (2002).
163. Id. at 35.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 36.
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ping the sign.”167 That effort, too, failed. Signs that relied upon
humans to remember to change their signal simply did not
work.168 The replacement tool Berwick contrasted was an automatic vacant/occupied sign of the sort used in aircraft lavatories to provide an extremely accurate indication of restroom
status.169 This tool was an example of a forcing function, borrowed from mistake-proofing, to create a situation in which the
actions are constrained so that failure at one stage prevents the
next step from happening.170
Another commentator expresses this problem more globally: “It is not sufficient to address excessive medical errors by
just adding more staff and more costs. Rather, it is important
to get at the root causes of errors and to design systems that
make the errors impossible to occur.”171 In the following subsection, we consider ways in which particular mistake-proofing
techniques can address causes of errors and thereby enhance
healthcare quality.
B. APPLICATIONS OF MISTAKE-PROOFING IN HEALTHCARE
SETTINGS
Mistake-proofing is typically inexpensive172 in comparison
with the extraordinary human and financial cost associated
with medical errors.173 It can therefore result in substantial returns on investment when applied to healthcare.174 Opportunities for mistake-proofing abound in healthcare, and, despite
some progress, many of these opportunities go unrealized. Enhanced understanding of why errors persist should lead to the
identification of mistake-proofing techniques capable of preventing or correcting the errors.175 Nonetheless, one can obtain

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Cf. id. at 37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37; see also GROUT, supra note 17, at 8–9.
ROBERT CHALICE, STOP RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS USING THE
TOYOTA LEAN PRODUCTION METHODS 25 (2d ed. 2005).
172. GROUT, supra note 17, at 14.
173. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, MEDICAL ERRORS:
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 1 (2003) (explaining that medical errors cost the
country $37.6 billion per year).
174. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 15–16.
175. See Kelly M. Pyrek, Can Medicine Be Made Mistake-Proof?,
CONTROL
TODAY
(Apr.
1,
2008),
INFECTION
http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/articles/can-medicine-be-made.html.
Later discussion will provide examples. See infra text accompanying notes
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a sense of mistake-proofing’s potential by examining some success stories using Tsuda’s typology in simplified healthcare settings before turning to more complex systems.176
Typically, several bags of intravenous fluids are hung from
IV poles in intensive care units. Tubes run out of the IV bags
and into infusion pumps that carefully measure the amount delivered to the patient’s bloodstream. Hooks holding the bags are
arrayed in four directions, in the manner of a compass. Many
infusion pumps are thus designed to handle up to four fluids
concurrently. Embo-Optics provides an improved IV pole that
allows the bags to be hung side-by-side and physically lined up
above the section of the infusion pump that is controlling the
relevant fluid.177 The pole is equipped with colored lights to illuminate each bag in semi-dark rooms.178 Color coding at the
other end of the IV tubes matches the colored lighting of the IV
fluids. Besides making the monitoring of the IVs easier, these
changes prevent mistakes and thus furnish an example of mistake prevention in the work environment.179
Hand hygiene is a critical factor in reducing the large
numbers of nosocomial infections.180 One hundred percent compliance with hand hygiene is very difficult to achieve.181 In an
179–202. For discussion of a more extensive set of examples, see GROUT, supra
note 17, at 117–46.
176. See Tsuda, supra note 133, at 80.
177. See
Vitaid
Anesthetic
Products,
IPV
MED.,
http://www.ipvmedical.com/vitaid.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
178. Id.
179. See IV Illuminators, MERCURY MED., http://mercurymed.com/catalogs/
RDR_IVIlluminators.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2012); Vitaid Anesthetic Products, supra note 177. In another example of mistake prevention in the work
environment (an example analogous to achieving more uniform coverage of
ceiling with pink paint that dries white), adding dye that changes the antiseptic Chlorhexidine from clear to blue-green made it far more popular with doctors who could see where they had missed. Surgical Products, SURGICAL
PRODS. MAG. (June 1, 2008), http://www.surgicalproductsmag.com/
scripts/default.asp (follow “Digital Edition” hyperlink; then follow “2008” under “Back Issues” hyperlink; then follow “June 2008” hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 6, 2012).
180. Hand Hygiene Recording and Reminding System, HYGREEN,
http://hygreen.com/index.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) [hereinafter
HYGREEN]. Infections acquired in hospitals take the lives of 270 patients per
day. Id.
181. The narcissism discussed earlier in the article, see supra Part III.C,
can play a role in something as simple as hand hygiene. See Mark Todd, Doctors Don’t Have Germs, Nurse Told, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 21,
2005), http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/doctors-dont-have-germs-nurse-
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example of mistake detection, Hygreen, Inc. has developed a
high technology monitoring system to detect mistakes in hand
hygiene.182 The system utilizes a device that senses handwashing by individual healthcare workers, who are identified
by an electronic badge they wear.183 The date, time, and location of the hand-washing are recorded in a centralized database
and a green light on the badge is illuminated.184 When a worker
approaches a patient’s bed, a sensor near the bed verifies that
hand-washing has occurred or causes the badge to vibrate if
hand-washing has not occurred.185 The green light turns off after coming in proximity with the bed’s sensor.186
More than 100,000 wheelchair-related injuries are treated
annually,187 with 167 deaths being recorded during the period
from 1997 through 1999.188 Many of these injuries occur when
patients are entering or leaving the wheelchair.189 If the patient forgets to engage the brake while transferring, the wheelchair can roll, toppling the patient. In an example of mistake
prevention through source inspection, there has been development of a mistake-proofing device that avoids this problem by
automatically locking the wheels whenever weight is not applied to the seat of the chair.190 A hand release allows an attendant to move unoccupied wheelchairs.191
In the past, blood pressure cuffs and thermometers contained potentially toxic mercury, which could be released if either item were damaged or not disposed of properly.192 In an
example of preventing the influence of mistakes, non-toxic matold/2005/06/20/1119250928025.html.
182. See HYGREEN, supra note 180.
183. HyGreen and Hand Hygiene: How it Works, HYGREEN,
http://hygreen.com/HandHygieneMonitor/How.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. H. Xiang et al., Wheelchair-Related Injuries Treated in U.S. Emergency Departments, 12 INJ. PREVENTION 8, 8 (2006).
MISTAKEPROOFING.COM,
188. John
Grout,
Examples
41–50,
http://www.mistakeproofing.com/example5.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
189. See Julie A. Braun, Legal and Medical Aspects of Long-Term Care Litigation, in 1 THE ELDER LAW PORTFOLIO SERIES 13-1, 13-183 to -184 (Harry S.
Margolis ed., 2007).
190. GROUT, supra note 17, at 56.
191. Id.
192. See Recommended Management and Disposal Options for MercuryContaining Products, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
hg/mgmt_options.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2012).
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terials are now substituted for the mercury.193
C. MISTAKE-PROOFING AND COMPLEX HEALTHCARE PROCESSES
The foregoing examples of mistake-proofing involve simple
solutions to rather simple, low-level problems. Mistake-proofing
in healthcare is not limited to problems of this nature, however.
It can also be applied to more complex processes. Problem diagnosis in more complex settings, however, often requires root
cause and failure/mode effects analysis (RCA). RCA adheres to
the mistake-proofing tenets that systems can be made safer by
design and that analysis of adverse events can guide this design.194
In more complex systems settings, there are almost always
multiple factors contributing to mistakes. No one of these factors alone is the root cause. Errors are a function of natural
weaknesses in human cognition and behavior (human factors)
interacting with systems errors (latent errors), with the result
that any well-intentioned professional who is placed in a poorly
designed system is likely to commit an error. Hence, in these
settings RCA might be better termed “contributing factors
analysis.” Contributing factors include such influences as management decisions, organizational processes, work conditions,
workload, supervision, knowledge, ability, and barriers.195 RCA
counters the tendency to focus on what appear to be the obvious
causes proximate to an adverse event and looks beyond to the
underlying causes. Information is gathered from a variety of
sources regarding broader, systemic factors. Structured inquiry
examines not only the active failure but work conditions, management decisions, and organizational processes, using such
techniques as cause-and-effect (“fishbone”) diagrams, process
flow charting, and multidisciplinary meetings.196
Consider, for example, the process of prescribing medicine
for patients. This deceptively simple process too often results in
prescription errors, which are costly occurrences.197 One hospi193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See id.
Kim, supra note 125; see GROUT, supra note 17, at 26–35.
Kim, supra note 125; see GROUT, supra note 17, at 26–35.
Kim, supra note 125; see GROUT, supra note 17, at 26–35.
See Lauran Neergaard, Medication Errors Injure More Than 1.5m,
BOSTON.COM, (July 21, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2006/07/21/medication_errors_injure_more_than_15m/ (“[A] serious drug error
can add more than $5,800 to the hospital bill of a single patient. Assuming
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tal reported that medication errors frequently stemmed from
the combination of pharmacists being unable to read prescriptions written by physicians, the need for immediate administration of medication when waiting presented risks, and the
unavailability of physicians to clarify the prescriptions due to
other commitments.198 An RCA of a medication error in a hospital revealed that the following factors contributed to the error’s occurrence: (1) containers containing the correct and incorrect medications looked similar; (2) the error occurred on a
Friday (patients prefer to be treated on Fridays and hospital
management liked to accommodate patients, leading to high
volume and the consequence that the pharmacist was hurried);
(3) staffing was inadequate on Fridays because there was not
enough room in the pharmacy to accommodate more pharmacists; and (4) the lack of room resulted from a building design
that could only accommodate two sterile hoods, one of which
was reserved for biological agents.199
Computer-assisted prescribing furnishes a partial answer
to the problem of medication error. Such prescribing has been
estimated to result in a fifty percent or greater reduction in errors.200 The imposition of information technology on flawed processes, however, has been analogized to paving over cart
paths.201 A more efficacious approach involves using failure
modes and effects analysis to prospectively identify high-risk
processes and create detailed process mapping. Next comes an
identification of all the ways in which errors may occur, as well
as consideration of the effects of the errors, followed by prioritizing the process steps based on the probability of occurrence
and consequences of failure. Mistake-proofing the process
would then be the final step.202 In the medication-error examthat hospitals commit 400,000 preventable drug errors each year, that’s $3.5
billion—not counting lost productivity and other costs—from hospitals
alone . . . .”).
198. Interview with C. Lynne Rover-Willoughby, Dir. of Med. Informatics,
Cmty. Health Network, in Indianapolis, Ind. (Oct. 19, 2004).
199. Kim, supra note 125.
200. CONSUMERS UNION, supra note 23, at 6.
201. Interview with Ronald W. Dollens, former President and Chief Exec.
Officer, Guidant Corp., in Bloomington, Ind. (Feb. 1, 2006); see Naresh Khatri
et al., Medical Errors and Quality of Care, 48 CAL. MGMT. REV. 115, 134–35
(2006).
202. Kim, supra note 125. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare executives
report that implementation of its Electronic Medical Record (EMR) system led
its hospitals to engage in a streamlining of healthcare processes, with substantial savings in time and money resulting from process improvements con-
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ple, mistake-proofing might involve the following actions: drug
containers could be designed so that medicines that are similar
in appearance are segregated in markedly different containers;
computerized physician-order entry systems could be employed
to remove the issue of illegibility and automatically signal drug
interactions; and scheduling could be managed to better balance prescription volume.
Given the previously discussed roles of complex processes,
chaotic team environments, and behavioral dysfunctions in
causing medical errors, one might expect HCPs to wholeheartedly embrace mistake-proofing because of its low cost and reliance upon fail-safe techniques.203 Despite mistake-proofing’s
potential to enhance healthcare quality in a relatively inexpensive fashion204 and despite the identification of many specific
mistake-proofing processes of a beneficial nature,205 mistakeproofing adoption has not occurred on as widespread basis as it
should have. In the following section, we consider a likely reason for that state of affairs.
V. IMPEDIMENTS TO WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF
MISTAKE-PROOFING IN HEALTHCARE FIELD
Because negligence liability is premised on harm-causing
mistakes that fall below the standard of due care, mistakeproofing efforts of the sort discussed in this article make a
great deal of sense in the healthcare environment. They are designed to lessen the likelihood of harm-causing medical errors,
and they relate directly to the individual-error, group-error,
and system-error aspects of the negligence liability environment faced by HCPs. Moreover, they typically do not carry a
hefty price tag and are relatively easy to implement.206 So why
sidered to be a necessary prerequisite to fully successful EMR implementation.
Interviews with Mark R. Neaman, CEO, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare,
past Chairman, Healthcare Leadership Council, and past Chairman, Nat’l
Comm. for Quality Healthcare, Jeffrey H. Hillebrand Chief Operating Officer,
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, Thomas H. Hodges Chief Fin. Officer,
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, Joseph Golbus President, ENH Med.
Grp., Peggy King Senior Vice President, Quality and Risk Mgmt., Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare, and Dr. Ned Wagner Med. Dir. of Med. Informatics,
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, in Evanston, IL (Apr. 19, 2006).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 62–109.
204. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 14.
205. See id. at 117–46.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 172–173.
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would HCPs resist implementation of mistake-proofing processes? A key reason appears to be the same one encountered in
regard to mistake-proofing efforts in the manufacturing context: concern that adoption of a mistake-proofing process after
harm has come to a patient (or a product user, in the product
liability setting) could be used against the defendant in the
harmed party’s attempt to have negligence liability imposed on
the defendant.207 In other words, HCPs are concerned about
falling victim to this argument: “Your adoption of the mistakeproofing process after I was harmed suggests that you should
have implemented it sooner in order to protect me—and others
like me—against being harmed. Therefore, your failure to
adopt the mistake-proofing process earlier indicates negligence
on your part.” But is this concern on the part of HCPs wellfounded? We turn to that question in the following discussion.
A. THE SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES RULES: CONTENT
AND RATIONALE
In order to determine whether the above-described concern
of HCPs is soundly based, we must address Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 407.208 This evidentiary rule is usually referred to
as the “subsequent remedial measures” rule because it is so titled.209 Although the negligence principles that govern malpractice cases exist as part of state law, such cases may be pursued in federal court if the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction are met. 210 For diversity jurisdiction to exist, the
plaintiff and the defendant(s) must be from different states and
the amount in controversy—the damages sought by the plaintiff—must exceed $75,000.211 Because some malpractice cases
may be litigated in federal court under the right set of conditions, FRE 407 is of considerable potential relevance to the issues addressed in this article. Although FRE 407 does not apply when malpractice cases are brought in state courts, as
207. The concern is that “[i]n claiming the ‘after,’ one must own up to the
‘before.’” GROUT, supra note 17, at 17. Cf. National Survey, supra note 5, at
218–19 (noting similar fear that may cause some HCPs not to fulfill their obligation to report medical errors even if the relevant state’s law requires such a
report).
208. FED. R. EVID. 407 (2006).
209. Id.; see also, e.g., C. Paul Carver, Subsequent Remedial Measures 2000
and Beyond, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 583, 584 (2001).
210. E.g., Leazer v. Kiefer, 821 P.2d 957, 960 (Idaho 1991); Darling v.
Charleston Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256–57 (Ill. 1965).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
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many of them are,212 state rules that match or closely resemble
FRE 407 normally will apply.213
FRE 407 reads as follows:
When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove:
•
negligence;
•
culpable conduct;
•
a defect in a product or its design; or
•
a need for a warning or instruction.
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as
impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.214

An evidentiary rule of similar content and effect exists in
most states.215 In the following discussion, we will often refer to
FRE 407 and its state law counterparts as the “subsequent remedial measures rules.”
The subsequent remedial measures rules rest on the policy
determination that steps to improve safety and minimize future

212. See SHOWALTER, supra note 34, at 39–77; WING, supra note 32, at
287–92.
213. See Carver, supra note 209, at 584, 587–89; Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 422 (2007); Roger C. Henderson, Product Liability and
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict By
Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64
NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
214. FED. R. EVID. 407. This version of the rule took effect in December
2011. Id. The version in effect from 1997 to December 2011 read as follows:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a
defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a
warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id. (superseded by revised version effective Dec. 1, 2011). The 2011 version
was “part of the general restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more
easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout
the rules.” Id. (Committee Notes on Rules—2011 Amendment). Because the
changes effected by the 2011 version were meant to be “stylistic only,” there
was “no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”
Id.
215. See Carver, supra note 209, at 584, 587–89; Guthrie, supra note 213,
at 422; Henderson, supra note 213, at 4. Details of the respective state rules
are beyond the scope of this article.
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harm are in the obvious interest of the public, and that their
implementation should therefore be encouraged. If, however,
evidence of a defendant’s post-harm-to-the-plaintiff adoption of
a safety measure could be used by the plaintiff to help make his
case against the defendant, there would be a disincentive to
adopt such measures.216 Under a regime of that nature, the defendant’s short-term interest in avoiding liability in a particular case could take priority in the defendant’s decision-making,
perhaps causing the defendant not to adopt what might otherwise be a perfectly sensible safety measure. Such a decision
would undermine the long-term interests in furthering safety
and minimizing future defects or errors.217
To serve the broader public interests at stake, then, evidentiary rules on subsequent remedial measures become necessary. With the defendant having the subsequent remedial
measures rules’ assurance that post-harm adoption of the safety measure will not disadvantage him, her, or it in the litigation at hand, the defendant should be more likely to do the
right thing and adopt the safety measure.218 Besides being in
the public interest, the measure should operate in the longterm interest of the defendant. If the measure lessens the likelihood of future instances of harm, it should correspondingly
reduce the amount of litigation with which the defendant might
otherwise have to contend.219
Of course, the subsequent remedial measures rules are
likely to help achieve their policy objective of encouraging the
adoption of safety measures only if defendants and would-be
defendants are sufficiently aware of the existence of such evidentiary rules. Such awareness on the part of manufacturers
probably has helped to pave the way toward broader adoption
of mistake-proofing processes in the manufacturing realm.220
Among HCPs, however, insufficient awareness that the subsequent remedial measures rules may be applied to their activi216. See Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; Henderson, supra note 213, at 5–
6; Joseph A. Hoffman & George D. Zuckerman, Tort Reform and Rules of Evidence: Saving the Rule Excluding Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Action, 22
TORT & INS. L.J. 497, 498 (1987).
217. Carver, supra note 209, at 610; Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; Henderson, supra note 213, at 5–6; Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 216, at 508.
218. See Carver, supra note 209, at 610; Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423;
Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 216, at 508.
219. See Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 216, at 508–09.
220. See Carver, supra note 209, at 610–11; Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra
note 216, at 508–09.
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ties could help explain why the adoption of mistake-proofing
techniques has not been more widespread in the healthcare
field.221
B. THE SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES RULES:
HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS
It is important to note that even though the subsequent
remedial measures rules may be applied most often in the context of product liability litigation, their application is not—and
should not be—restricted to that context.222 FRE 407 does say,
of course, that evidence of a subsequent remedial measure cannot be used to prove the existence of “a defect in a product or its
design; or a need for a warning or instruction.”223 Although the
quoted language directly contemplates product liability cases,
earlier language in FRE 407 indicates that the rule can be applied outside the product liability context. The rule states that
evidence of subsequent remedial measures cannot be used to
prove “negligence [or] culpable conduct” on the part of the defendant.224 This portion of the rule speaks in terms of failures
to use reasonable care more generally, without any language
limiting the “negligence [or] culpable conduct” reference to the
product liability setting.225 Subsequent remedial measures
rules among the states are to the same general effect.226 Be221. See GROUT, supra note 17, at 17–18.
222. See Henderson, supra note 213, at 1–6; see also FED. R. EVID. 407
(Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules) (noting that “courts have
applied this principle to exclude evidence of subsequent repairs, installation of
safety devices, changes in company rules, and discharge of employees”). Some
states’ formulations of the subsequent remedial measures rules do not contain
language specifically mentioning product defects and subsequent corrective
measures—a further indication that the rules are not meant to be restricted to
the context of product liability litigation. See Carver, supra note 209, at 587–
89. Although the subsequent remedial measures rules normally are interpreted as having potential applicability to product liability cases regardless of
whether the specific formulations expressly mention product safety, there has
been some division among the states as to whether the rules apply in all product liability cases (whether negligence-based or brought on a strict liability
theory), or only in those product liability cases that are negligence-based. See
id. at 587–91; Henderson, supra note 213, at 3–20. Further exploration of the
latter set of issues is beyond the scope of this article.
223. FED. R. EVID. 407.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See Guthrie, supra note 213, at 422–23; Henderson, supra note 213, at
1–6.
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cause malpractice cases against HCPs are based on principles
of “negligence” and require proof of “culpable conduct” in the
form of a failure to use reasonable care, the subsequent remedial measures rules are applicable in the healthcare realm.227
Accordingly, if an HCP being sued by a harmed plaintiff is
considering adoption of a mistake-proofing process meant to
reduce the likelihood that a future patient would be harmed in
the way the plaintiff was, the HCP’s decision on whether to
adopt the mistake-proofing process should be made with
knowledge of the protection afforded by the subsequent remedial measures rules. Concern of the “they’ll use it against me in
the lawsuit” variety is not a well-founded reason for rejecting
implementation of such a safety measure when it otherwise
seems reasonable and would further a long-term interest that
the HCP and its future patients share: the interest in lessening
the likelihood of medical errors.
It should be noted, of course, that even though the subsequent remedial measures rules have the above-noted general
effect of prohibiting plaintiffs from making evidentiary use of
later safety measures in an effort to prove the defendant’s negligence,228 the rules do not furnish a guarantee that evidence of
such measures can never be used. FRE 407, for instance, permits the use of such evidence when it is offered “for another
purpose, such as impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.”229
These exceptional instances depend, however, on litigation tactics and/or testimony in which the defendant effectively opens
the door to use of evidence of the safety measures.230 Absent
such opening of the door, the defendant’s mere adoption of the
safety measure is not enough to justify admission of evidence
thereof.231

227. See FED. R. EVID. 407; see also id. (Notes of Advisory Committee on
Proposed Rules) (noting examples of contexts in which rule applies); Henderson, supra note 213, at 1–6 (noting application of federal and state rules in
negligence cases).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 214–218, 222–227.
229. FED. R. EVID. 407.
230. The “if disputed” language in the rule is the key here. See id.
231. In any litigation in which issues may arise under the relevant subsequent remedial measures rule, the mistake-proofing HCP would be welladvised to file a motion in limine in an effort to get the evidentiary questions
sorted out and ruled upon ahead of trial. The same would be true where the
HCP has adopted mistake-proofing processes concerning some of its
healthcare services but not regarding the different particular services the
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VI. MISTAKE-PROOFING AND ERROR REDUCTION:
WHAT TO DO?
We turn here to recommendations that flow from the article’s earlier sections dealing with the need to reduce the rate
and number of medical errors, the usefulness in that regard of
mistake-proofing techniques, and the impediments to more
widespread adoption of such techniques. Some recommendations in the following subsections have a specific mistakeproofing thrust; others speak to error-reduction issues more
generally.
A. ENHANCE HCPS’ UNDERSTANDING OF NEGLIGENCE
PRINCIPLES AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS
As earlier discussion revealed, HCPs are not legally liable
to a patient every time a bad outcome resulted from medical
treatment they ordered or administered. Rather, HCPs are liable only if the bad outcome resulted from medical treatment
that reflected negligence because it fell below the standard of
reasonable care examined earlier in the article.232 One presumes—and hopes—that most HCPs are aware of these fundamental principles. Yet even if HCPs have this awareness,
they need a realistic understanding of what the reasonable care
standard actually contemplates.
For instance, the reasonable care standard does not require
the ordering of every conceivable test or procedure that a physician might order for a given patient who displays certain
symptoms. If it is quite unlikely that a particular disease or
condition would be the cause of the symptoms and much more
likely that another explanation is the genuine one, the hypothetical reasonable physician against whom the actual physician is measured might decline to order a test that would rule
out the quite unlikely disease or condition. Thus, the physician
who does not order that test may well have exercised reasonable care.233 This is especially apt to be the case if the test for
plaintiff was receiving when she experienced harm. Evidence of such adoption
of mistake-proofing processes by the HCP should not be admissible to prove
negligence in failing to mistake-proof the particular services received by the
plaintiff. Allowing such evidence to be admitted would violate at least the spirit of the subsequent remedial measures rules. A general lack-of-relevance objection would also be appropriate.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52, 110–113.
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the improbable condition is also very expensive or physically
onerous for the patient.234 Of course, other factors—such as extreme severity of the potentially resulting harm to the patient
if she in fact has the improbable condition—could tip the scales
the other way on whether a reasonable physician would order
the test.235 Even so, this basic point remains valid: properly applied, negligence law’s reasonable care standard does not contemplate a tests-and-procedures arms race in which HCPs who
fail to keep up are necessarily doomed to liability.
Physicians and other HCPs frequently invoke the defensive
medicine argument in response to the foregoing paragraph’s
observations. If we do not order this vast array of tests and procedures, the argument goes, we will be sued. Therefore, the argument continues, we end up ordering tests and procedures
that we really do not think are necessary (or even very desirable) in order to protect ourselves against the litigation that in
today’s environment almost certainly will follow if we do not
take such defensive steps.236
Those who make the defensive medicine argument do so
with considerable earnestness, but they may suffer from distorted senses of the respective likelihoods of being sued for
malpractice and being held liable in such cases. Contrary to the
argument’s premise that lawsuits and potential liability are a
given unless the HCP engages in what amounts to overtreating, the percentage of patients who take legal action over
medical errors that harmed them has been shown to be as low
as only three to six percent.237 Moreover, in the small percentage of instances when an error does result in litigation, plain-

234. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52.
235. See id.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 110–113.
237. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 399 n.26 (2005). Other estimates
put the percentage higher, at ten to fourteen percent. Neil Vidmar, Medical
Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1226–27 (2005). Regardless of whether the correct estimate is three to six percent or, instead, ten
to fourteen percent, it is clear that the vast majority of harmed patients do not
file claims. Id. at 1227–28; see also Hyman & Silver, supra note 110, at 976;
David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006). Physicians, however, have been shown to overestimate significantly their actual
risk of being sued. One study concluded that physicians perceive the risk of
being sued as three times greater than it actually is. Gunnar, supra note 110,
at 476.
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tiffs win their cases only about twenty-five percent of the
time.238 HCPs naturally do not want to be in the groups sued
and/or held liable, even if those groups are statistically small.
However, a more realistic understanding among HCPs of the
likelihood—really unlikelihood—of being sued, let alone being
held liable, should work to the benefit of HCPs and the
healthcare system by lessening HCPs’ tendencies to think extreme defensive medicine is necessary and by reducing the considerable costs that accompany unwarranted tests and procedures.
By ordering tests and procedures they, in the exercise of
their professional judgment, would not order if not for their inaccurate sense of the risk of litigation and liability, physicians
are not necessarily increasing the quality of care and are doing
little or nothing to reduce medical error frequency.239 Moreover,
what they see as an objectionable but necessary litigation riskmitigation strategy may be a counterproductive self-fulfilling
prophecy. If large numbers of physicians operate under the
misimpression that they have to order tests and procedures
they would not otherwise order, then doing so indeed becomes
the norm despite its lack of soundness. It also creates the potential for an unwarranted ratcheting-up of the reasonable care
standard, as a plaintiff’s attorney can argue that with everybody else ordering this huge battery of tests and procedures, a
particular defendant’s failure to do so must have been wrong.240
To the extent that judges and juries buy this view of what
should constitute reasonable care, HCPs will continue to feel
hamstrung in their attempts to exercise their professional
judgment. It is a hamstringing brought on in large part, however, by HCPs’ failure to have a realistic sense of their chances
of being sued and of being held liable.
Acquiring the realistic understanding that the chances of
being sued and of being held liable are small should give HCPs
greater confidence that they do not reflexively have to join the
unwarranted tests-and-procedures arms race. In the process,
238. Sharkey, supra note 237, at 451–52; Vidmar, supra note 237, at 1232.
239. They may even be increasing the risk of errors, as each additional procedure presents a risk of error. Sanjay Gupta, More Treatment, More Mistakes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, at A21.
240. As earlier discussion suggested, one consideration in the reasonable
care standard is what other HCPs are or are not doing. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52.

LANGVARDT_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

MISTAKE-PROOFING MEDICINE

2/11/2013 11:38 AM

431

they can free themselves to do what they entered the profession
to do: exercise their best judgment in an effort to promote the
health of their patients. Rather than being so concerned about
the seeming imperative to order unwarranted tests and procedures, HCPs can direct greater attention to the adoption of
measures that really can improve healthcare quality, reduce
error risk, and lessen the danger of liability: the mistakeproofing processes examined herein.241
As noted earlier, adoption of mistake-proofing can have
implications for the reasonable care standard’s application in
negligence cases dealing with medical errors. Just as the use of
mistake-proofing processes can serve as evidence that due care
was exercised, a defendant’s failure to adopt mistake-proofing
processes could suggest a failure to use reasonable care—
especially if other HCPs begin adopting such techniques on a
more widespread basis.242 Would not the latter effect amount to
a ratcheting-up of the reasonable care standard, and would not
that be a good reason for HCPs generally to shy away from going the mistake-proofing route (on the theory that if no one is
doing it, an individual HCP’s failure to do it might not be seen
as a failure to use due care)? The first part of this compound
question merits a “yes” answer; the second part, a “no.”
One can fairly assume that if mistake-proofing processes
became widely adopted, such processes would become part of
what constitutes reasonable care. In that event, an HCP’s failure to adopt appropriate processes of that sort could suggest a
failure to exercise reasonable care and could therefore help
support a negligence claim.243 But that prospect does not furnish a sound reason for HCPs to resist, on an en masse basis,
adoption of mistake-proofing processes in order to avoid a situation in which mistake-proofing utilization becomes part of the
reasonable care norm (to the possible detriment of certain
HCPs who become defendants). Such a strategy on the part of
HCPs would miss a far more important point: that adoption of
mistake-proofing techniques would greatly benefit HCPs in a
liability avoidance sense.
If mistake-proofing prevents many medical errors—and

241. See supra text accompanying notes 122–205.
242. Again, a consideration in the reasonable care standard is what other
HCPs are or are not doing. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52; supra
note 44.
243. Hill, Langvardt & Massey, supra note 2, at 165–68.
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there is reliable evidence that it does244—there will be fewer
and fewer instances in which error-related bad outcomes for
patients occur. If there is no error, there can be no liability.245
The prevention of errors will also go a long way toward reducing the number of bad outcomes for patients. Of course, it is not
possible to eliminate all risks of harms. Bad outcomes sometimes result even when all due care was exercised. But any
HCP, regardless of his, her, or its views concerning the legal
system and the rules of tort liability, obviously wants to reduce
the risks of harms to patients to the extent reasonably possible.
Mistake-proofing holds great promise for doing so.246
B. ENHANCE HCPS’ UNDERSTANDING OF FRE 407 AND ITS
STATE COUNTERPARTS
As an earlier section explained, a lack of understanding on
the part of HCPs concerning FRE 407 and its state counterparts can present an impediment to the adoption of mistakeproofing processes in the healthcare environment. The concern
is that HCPs’ implementation of a mistake-proofing measure
after an incident in which harm came to a patient might be
used against the HCPs in litigation over that harm, on the theory that pre-harm implementation of the measure could have
prevented the harm and that the failure to adopt the measure
earlier was a failure to use reasonable care.247 To the extent
that this concern is widespread, HCPs could perceive a disincentive to adopt mistake-proofing processes and, accordingly,
could refrain from taking such sensible steps.
The concern is largely unwarranted, however. The impediment it poses to adoption of mistake-proofing measures can be
overcome through educating HCPs on the purposes and effects
of FRE 407 and the similar evidentiary rules existing in many
states. As previous discussion revealed, these subsequent remedial measures rules provide that evidence of safety enhancement measures taken by a defendant to address the type of risk
and harm already experienced by a plaintiff cannot generally
be used against the defendant in the plaintiff’s attempt to es-

244. See supra text accompanying notes 122–205.
245. E.g., WING, supra note 32, at 291–92.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 133–205.
247. GROUT, supra note 17, at 17. See supra text accompanying notes 207,
216–217.
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tablish negligence on the defendant’s part. Thus, if the plaintiff
is to establish negligence, the plaintiff must do so on the basis
of evidence other than the defendant’s later adoption of the
safety measure.248
The subsequent remedial measures rules exist to eliminate
a disincentive to the adoption of safety enhancement
measures—the disincentive resulting from defendants’ concern
that the adoption of the measures could come back to haunt
them in a negligence case dealing with harm that preceded
adoption of the measures.249 This is the very concern that can
operate problematically in the context of medical errorreduction efforts. Hence, achieving greater awareness among
HCPs concerning the subsequent remedial measures rules and
their purpose of eliminating a disincentive to the adoption of
safety enhancement measures should be a key piece of a strategy to encourage more widespread adoption of mistake-proofing
processes in healthcare settings.
C. ENHANCE NATIONAL TRACKING AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF
PATIENT-SAFETY EFFORTS
A national move to track and encourage patient-safety efforts on the part of HCPs should help facilitate expanded utilization of mistake-proofing processes. Although the federal government and private organizations have been somewhat active
in promoting patient safety efforts,250 a more tightly coordinated national program along those lines is needed. Wider adoption of mistake-proofing processes and more extensive reporting by HCPs on those actions (whether to a federal agency or
an organization operating under a public-private arrangement)
would make even more meaningful best-practices reports possible.251 Such reports could encourage HCPs to make greater
use of mistake-proofing processes by revealing those processes’
error-reduction propensities and cost-effective nature.
The goal of increasing the adoption of mistake-proofing
measures by HCPs could be furthered, of course, through fed248. FED. R. EVID. 407; see also Carver, supra note 209, at 584, 587–89;
Henderson, supra note 213, at 4–6.
249. Guthrie, supra note 213, at 423; Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note
216, at 498. For further discussion of the subsequent remedial measures rules,
see supra text accompanying notes 208–231.
250. For a discussion of the federal government’s patient safety efforts, see
supra note 115.
251. See supra note 115.
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eral requirements that would mandate such measures as well
as periodic reports by HCPs on what they have done in that regard. In today’s often gridlocked legislative environment, however, a proposal to impose such requirements by statute could
be a non-starter. Imposing such requirements through agency
regulations (assuming that previous statutes’ delegations of
power would be broad enough to permit such regulations) could
not only trigger political objections252 but also involve significant practical obstacles. Regulations requiring the adoption of,
and reporting on, mistake-proofing processes would have to be
extremely specific and detailed. They would need to address
such issues as which HCPs are subject to the requirements,
which particular mistake-proofing techniques are mandated,
what type and level of implementation by an HCP constitutes
compliance, what consequences ensue if the HCP does not comply, and various others. The level of detail that would be necessary in such regulations would make their prompt promulgation very unlikely. Even if the regulations ultimately were
promulgated, the problem of medical errors would continue to
be insufficiently mitigated during the intervening years.
A more promising avenue would be to have federal regulations that encourage the use of mistake-proofing through
providing incentives for doing so. Regulations of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services already call for financial reimbursement to HCPs to be based more on health outcomes than
had been the case in the past.253 Reimbursement-related incentives for adopting mistake-proofing processes would be a logical
addition to those regulations. Although the literal application
of the regulations would be confined to the Medicare and Medicaid contexts, HCPs that implement mistake-proofing techniques because of Medicare and Medicaid-related incentives
would seem likely to employ those techniques more broadly
(i.e., even outside the Medicare and Medicaid contexts) once
they see the error-reduction values of the techniques.
In addition, the federal government has utilized financial
incentives as a way of encouraging the adoption of electronic
medical records and electronic systems for prescribing medica-

252. See, e.g., supra note 1.
253. See QUALITY MEASURE REPORTING, supra note 119; Kevin Sack, Medicare Rules Say ‘Do No Harm’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A1.
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tions.254 With error reduction being a primary goal of those incentives, a similar approach would make sense in regard to
mistake-proofing measures. A further possible regulatory avenue could be the addition of incentives for error-reduction
measures to the rules governing Accountable Care Organizations, whose creation is encouraged in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.255
D. ACCELERATE THE ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS FOR
PRESCRIBING MEDICATIONS
Earlier discussion in the article noted a number of mistake-proofing techniques that can be very helpful in healthcare
contexts.256 Of course, we advocate adoption of those techniques. We give special emphasis here, however, to the importance of broader utilization of electronic systems for prescribing medications. As noted earlier, the numbers of
medication errors remain unreasonably high, with the consequences for patients in too many instances being devastating.257 Electronic systems have been shown to be highly effective in reducing the numbers of medication errors.258 Prudent
HCPs clearly should be moving in the direction of using such
systems.
Because costs obviously can be an issue, the previously
noted federal incentives for adopting electronic prescribing systems should be continued and probably enhanced in order to
speed the rate at which such adoption takes place. Prudent insurance companies should also reward insureds that adopt
electronic prescribing systems by charging them reduced premiums, given that such systems’ demonstrated usefulness in
reducing or eliminating errors should lead to less risk of liabil-

254. See 42 C.F.R. § 423.159–160 (2011); Steve Lohr, Big Medical Groups
Begin Patient Data-Sharing Project, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/big-medical-groups-begin-patientdata-sharing-project/.
255. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 280g-12, 1395jjj (2011); Medicare Shared Savings
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,973 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
425).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 171–205.
257. See supra note 7; supra text accompanying notes 197–202. See also
Denham et al., supra note 6, at 5, 8 (discussing, among other sorts of medical
errors, medication errors and the havoc they may wreak); IOM, PREVENTING
MEDICATION ERRORS, supra note 7, at 113–14 (estimating that at least 1.5
million preventable medication errors occur each year).
258. E.g., Denham et al., supra note 6, at 8.
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ity for HCPs and their insurers.
E. MAKE MEDICAL ERROR-REPORTING A NATIONAL
REQUIREMENT
The federal government has taken steps down the medical
error-reporting path, but the scheme set up so far makes reporting optional.259 Although roughly half of the states have
medical error-reporting laws, with many of them ostensibly
making reporting mandatory,260 chronic under-reporting appears to plague the state schemes.261 When the absence of a
federal requirement is coupled with the incomplete, patchworkquilt nature of state reporting requirements and the concerns
about under-reporting in states that do have reporting laws,
the resulting picture does not capture the full extent of the
medical error problem. Only a national reporting requirement
can provide a true basis for determining whether the problem
is lessening, increasing, or remaining at the same level over
time. A national reporting requirement also can lead to a meaningful system of accountability in which HCPs that commit
large numbers of errors can be identified by consumers making
healthcare purchasing decisions and by government agency
personnel determining whether regulatory action may be warranted.
Although the details of a national regulatory regime requiring error-reporting are largely beyond the scope of this article, three key points are worth noting here. First, a useful
foundation is already in place in the work of the National Quality Forum. This private organization has compiled a list of
twenty-nine “serious reportable events”—a list generally utilized in the present optional reporting systems.262 This list
would be of obvious value in a regulatory switch to mandatory
reporting because it would mean that the government would
not have to start from scratch in determining what should be
on the list of errors to be reported. Second, in order to safeguard the privacy interests of patients, regulations should specify that the information reported by the HCP not contain pa-

259.
260.
261.
262.

See supra note 115.
See National Survey, supra note 5, at 213–20.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN
HEALTHCARE—2011 UPDATE: A CONSENSUS REPORT (2011).
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tients’ names. Third, in order to encourage compliance with the
reporting requirement, regulations must provide that in a
harmed patient’s negligence (or other malpractice) lawsuit concerning an HCP’s supposed error, the fact that the HCP submitted an error report and the content of the HCP’s report are
both non-discoverable and not subject to evidentiary use.263
HCPs thus would not need to be concerned that, by complying
with the federal reporting requirement, they would be helping
the plaintiff make out his or her case.
F. CONVINCE LIABILITY INSURERS TO EMPLOY EXPERIENCE
RATING
In the automobile insurance setting, a driver whose negligence has caused accidents is very likely to be charged higher
premiums than those charged to an otherwise similarly situated driver who does not have a history of accident involvement.
One would expect a similar approach to be employed in the
realm of medical liability insurance, so that, say, a physician
against whom multiple malpractice complaints have been made
would pay more in premiums than would a same-practice-area
physician against whom no or very few malpractice claims had
been lodged. But malpractice insurance rating—the process by
which premiums are set—often does not work that way. In setting premiums for physicians, for instance, insurers frequently
classify physicians according to specialty and geographic area,
and then charge the same premiums to all those of a particular
specialty within a certain geographic area.264 Under this approach, the history or lack of history of malpractice claims
against the physician receives little or no consideration when
the amount of the premium is determined.265 The seemingly error-prone physician therefore ends up paying premiums of the
same amount paid by the non-error-prone physician.
A switch to experience rating—leading to higher premiums
for those with a history of negligence complaints against them
and lower premiums for those without such a history—would
logically furnish an incentive to HCPs to take steps to minimize
the chances of error. The cause of broadening the utilization of
mistake-proofing processes could thus be furthered by such a

263. Such features are present in the current optional reporting system,
see supra note 115, and should be continued.
264. Gunnar, supra note 110, at 471.
265. Id.; Hyman & Silver, supra note 110, at 981–82.
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change in how insurers determine the amounts of premiums.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although harm-causing errors can never be totally eliminated from our healthcare system, the numbers of errors that
continue to occur remain surprisingly high. Mistake-proofing
processes afford great promise as error-reduction devices and
have the further advantage of being cost-effective. Yet obstacles
seemingly have blocked more widespread utilization of such
processes. As the article has noted, some of these obstacles
have stemmed from HCPs’ unclear or flat-out erroneous understanding of relevant legal principles dealing with matters of liability and admissible evidence. Overcoming these impediments in the manner explored in the article and adopting the
error-reduction recommendations made here would furnish
benefits all around. Patients would benefit through receiving
enhanced quality of care and through a reduction in their
chances of being harmed by medical error. Society and the
healthcare system as a whole would benefit through cost savings associated with many fewer instances of error and through
consumers’ greater confidence in the quality of the care they receive. HCPs would benefit by having to worry less about liability and by thus being freed-up to focus more on what they entered the healthcare field to do: provide high-quality care that
improves patients’ lives.

